LIBRARY
OF THE
Church Divinity School
of the Pacific

No. 2822 Class 204
Ex Dono Rev. W. I. Kip, Jr.
Date Jan. 1900

Presented by Mrs Patterson
to the Rev. Wm I. Kip
Dec. 1836

Contents

1. Mr. Law's Answer to the Fable of the Bees.
2. On the Unlawfulness of the Stage.
3. Law's Answer to Tindal.

E. D. Rattoone

REMARKS

UPON

A Late BOOK,

ENTITULED,

The FABLE *of the* BEES,

OR

Private VICES, *Publick* BENEFITS.

IN A

LETTER to the AUTHOR.

To which is added,

A POSTSCRIPT, containing an Observation or two upon Mr. BAYLE.

By WILLIAM LAW, *M. A.*

The Second Edition.

LONDON:

Printed for WILLIAM and JOHN INNYS at the West-end of St. *Paul's*, 1725.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026 with funding from
Graduate Theological Union

https://archive.org/details/remarksuponlateb00laww



SIR,

I HAVE read your ſeveral Compoſitions in favour of the Vices and Corruptions of Mankind; and hope I need make no Apology, for preſuming to offer a Word or two on the Side of Virtue and Religion.

I ſhall ſpend no Time in Preface, or general Reflexions, but proceed directly to the Examination of ſuch Paſſages as expoſe *moral Virtue*, as a Fraud and Impoſition, and render all Pretences to it, as odious and contemptible.

Tho' I direct my ſelf to you, I hope it will be no Offence, if I ſometimes ſpeak, as if I was ſpeaking to a Chriſtian, or ſhew ſome ways of thinking, that may be owing to that kind of worſhip which is profeſſed

amongſt us. Ways of thinking deriv'd from reveal'd Religion are much more ſuitable to our low Capacities, than any arrogant Pretences to be wiſe, by our own Light.

Moral Virtue, however diſregarded in Practice, has hitherto had a ſpeculative Eſteem amongſt Men; her Praiſes have been celebrated by Authors of all kinds, as the confeſs'd Beauty, Ornament and Perfection of Human Nature.

On the contrary, *Immorality* has been look'd upon as the greateſt Reproach and Torment of Mankind; no Satyr hath been thought ſevere enough upon its natural Baſeneſs and Deformity, nor any Wit able to expreſs the Evils it occaſions in private Life and publick Societies.

Your Goodneſs would not ſuffer you to ſee, this part of Chriſtendom, deluded with ſuch falſe Notions, of I know not what *Excellence* in Virtue, or *Evil* in Vice; but oblig'd you immediately to compoſe a *Syſtem*, (as you call it) wherein you do theſe three things.

1*ſt*. You conſider Man, *merely* as an *Animal* having like other Animals, nothing to do but to follow his Appetites.

2*dly* You conſider Man as cheated and flatter'd out of his natural State, by the Craft of Moraliſts, and pretend to be very ſure,

ſure, that the *moral Virtues are the political offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.*

So that Man and Morality are here both deſtroy'd together; Man is declar'd to be only an *Animal,* and Morality an Impoſture.

According to this Doctrine, to ſay that a Man is diſhoneſt, is making him juſt ſuch a Criminal, as a Horſe that does not dance.

But this is not all, for you dare farther affirm in praiſe of Immorality, *That Evil as well moral, as natural, is the ſolid Baſis, the Life and Support of all Trades and Employments without exception; that there we muſt look for the true Origin of all Arts and Sciences, and that the Moment Evil ceaſes, the Society muſt be ſpoil'd, if not diſſolv'd* *.

Theſe are the chief Doctrines, which with more than Fanatick Zeal you recommend to your Readers; and if lewd Stories, prophane Obſervations, looſe Jeſts, and haughty Aſſertions, might paſs for Arguments, few People would be able to diſpute with you.

I ſhall begin with your Definition of Man. *As for my part,* ſay you, *without any Compliment to the courteous Reader, or my ſelf, I believe, Man* (*beſides Skin, Fleſh, Bones,* &c. *that are obvious to the Eye*)

---

* p. ccccxxviii.

Eye) *to be a Compound of various Paſſions, that all* of *them as they are provok'd, and come uppermoſt, govern him by turns whether he will or no* *.

Surely this Definition is too General, becauſe it ſeems to ſuit a *Wolf* or a *Bear*, as exactly as your ſelf, or a *Grecian Philoſopher*.

You ſay, *you believe Man to be*, &c. now I can't underſtand to what part of you, this believing Faculty is to be aſcrib'd; for your Definition of Man makes him incapable of believing any thing, unleſs believing can be ſaid to be a *Paſſion*, or ſome Faculty of *Skin* or *Bones*.

But ſuppoſing ſuch a Belief as yours, becauſe of its blindneſs, might juſtly be call'd a Paſſion, yet ſurely there are greater things conceiv'd by ſome Men, than can be aſcrib'd to mere Paſſions, or Skin and Fleſh.

That reach of Thought, and ſtrong Penetration which has carry'd Sir *Iſaac Newſon* through ſuch Regions of Science, muſt truely be owing to ſome higher Principle. Or will you ſay, that all his Demonſtrations, are only ſo many blind Sallies of Paſſion?

If Man had nothing but *Inſtincts* and *Paſſions*, he could not *diſpute* about them; for

---

* Introd.

for to *diſpute* is no more an *Inſtinct*, or a *Paſſion*, than it is a *Leg*, or an *Arm*.

If therefore you would prove your ſelf to be no more, than a *Brute*, or an *Animal*, how much of your Life you need alter I can't tell, but you muſt at leaſt forbear writing againſt Virtue, for no *mere Animal* ever hated it.

But however, ſince you deſire to be thought only *Skin* and *Fleſh*, and *a Compound of Paſſions*, I'll forget your better part, as much as you have done, and conſider you in your own way. You tell us, *that the moral Virtues are the political offſpring, which Flattery begot upon Pride* *.

You therefore who are an Advocate for moral Vices, ſhould by the Rule of Contraries, be ſuppoſed to be acted by *Humility*; but that being (as I think) not of the number of the Paſſions, you have no Claim to be guided by it.

The prevailing Paſſions, which you ſay have the ſole Government of Man in their turns, are Pride, Shame, Fear, Luſt, and Anger; you have appropriated the moral Virtues to *Pride*, ſo that your own Conduct muſt be aſcribed either to Fear, Shame, Anger or Luſt, or elſe to a beautiful Union and Concurrence of them all.

I don't

---

* p. xxxvii.

I don't doubt, but you are already angry, that I conſider you, only as an Animal, that acts as Anger or Luſt or any other Paſſion moves it, altho' it is your own Aſſertion, that you are no better. But to proceed,

Sagacious Moraliſts, ſay you, *draw Men like Angels, in hopes, that the Pride at leaſt of ſome, will put them upon copying after the beautiful Originals, which they are repreſented to be* *.

I am loth to charge you with Sagacity, becauſe I would not accuſe you falſly, but if this Remark is well made, I can help you to another full as juſt, viz. *That Sagacious Advocates for Immorality, draw Men like Brutes, in hopes, that the Depravity at leaſt of ſome, will put them upon copying after the baſe Originals, which they are repreſented to be.*

The Province you have choſen for your ſelf, is to deliver Man from the *Sagacity* of Moraliſts, the Encroachments of Virtue, and to re-place him in the Rights and Privileges of Brutality; to recall him from the giddy Heights of rational Dignity, and Angelick likeneſs, to go to Graſs, or wallow in the Mire.

Had the Excellence of Man's Nature, been only a falſe Inſinuation of crafty Politicians, the very falſeneſs of the thing, had made

* p. xxxviii.

made ſome Men at Peace with it, but this Doctrine coming from Heaven, its being a principle of Religion, and a foundation of ſolid Virtue, has rouz'd up all this Zeal againſt it.

And God ſaid, *Let us make Man in our own Image, after our Likeneſs.*

This was a Declaration of the Dignity of Man's Nature, made long before any of your Sagacious Moraliſts had a Meeting. As this Doctrine came thus early from Heaven, ſo in the ſeveral Ages of the World, God has had his *Oracles*, and *Prophets*, to raiſe Mens Thoughts to their firſt Original; to preſerve a Senſe of their Relation to God, and Angelick Natures, and encourage them to expect a State of Greatneſs ſuitable to that Image after which they were created. To aſſure *them*, that, *they that ſleep in the Duſt of the Earth ſhall awake, ſome to Everlaſting Life, and ſome to ſhame and everlaſting Contempt. And they that be wiſe ſhall ſhine as the brightneſs of the Firmament*, and *they that turn many to Righteouſneſs, as the Stars for ever and ever**.

The laſt Revelation which God has made to the World, by his Son Jeſus Chriſt, is greatly Glorious in this reſpect, that it has

* Dan. xii. 2, 3.

more perfectly brought Life and Immortality to light; that it turns our Thoughts from the low ſatisfactions of Fleſh and Senſe, to preſs and aſpire after that deathleſs State of Greatneſs, where we ſhall be *as the Angels of God.*

It is not therefore the Sagacity and Cunning of any Philoſophers that has trick'd Men into Notions of Morality, as a thing ſuitable to a pretended Dignity of Nature within them.

But it is God himſelf, who firſt declared the Excellence of human Nature, and has made ſo many Revelations ſince, to fill Mens Minds with high and noble Deſires ſuitable to it,

Before I proceed to conſider your *Enquiry into your Origin of moral Virtue*, I ſhall take Notice of the Apology that you make to Jews and Chriſtians.

You are ſenſible that what you have ſaid is inconſiſtent, both with the Old and New Teſtament, and therefore thus excuſe yourſelf to your ſcrupulous Reader.

That in *your Enquiry into the Origin of moral Virtue, you ſpeak neither of Jews nor Chriſtians, but Man in his State of Nature* and *Ignorance of the true Deity* *.

The

---

* p. xxxv.

The Abſurdity of this Apology will appear from hence; Let us ſuppoſe that you had been making an *Enquiry into the Origin of the World*, and ſhould declare that it aroſe from a *caſual Concourſe of Atoms*, and then tell your ſcrupulous Reader, by way of Excuſe, that you did not mean the World, which *Jews* and *Chriſtians* dwell upon, but that which is inhabited *by Man in his State of Nature and Ignorance of the true Deity*. Could any thing be more weak or ſenſeleſs than ſuch an Apology? yet it is exactly the ſame as that which you have here made.

For the difference of *Jew* or *Heathen*, no more ſuppoſes or allows of two different *Origins of Morality*, than it ſuppoſes or allows of two different Origins of the World.

For as the Creation of the World was over, and owing to its true Cauſe, before the Exiſtence of either *Jew* or *Heathen*, ſo Morality was in being, and ſprung from its proper Source, before either Jew or Heathen came into the World. And conſequently neither the Origin of the one or the other admits of any different Account, becauſe in the after Ages of the World, ſome People were call'd *Jews*, and others *Heathens*. Beſides, if you contradict the Religion of Jews and Chriſtians, in your Account of Morality, is it leſs a Contra-

diction, or leſs falſe, becauſe you pretend that your Face was turn'd towards *Pagans?*

If you was to aſſert that there was no God, or true Religion, could it be any Excuſe, to ſay that you was ſpeaking to a *Mahometan?*

2dly To defend your Account of the Origin of Morality, you ſuppoſe Man in a State of Nature, ſavage and brutal, without any Notions of Morality or Ideas of Religion.

Now this very Suppoſition, is ſo far from being any Apology for you, that it enhances your Accuſation: For you ſuppoſe ſuch a State of Nature, (as you call it) as the Scripture makes it morally impoſſible, that Men ſhould ever have been in.

When *Noah*'s Family came out of the Ark, we preſume, they were as well educated in the Principles of Virtue and moral Wiſdom, as any People were ever ſince; at leaſt we are ſure they were well inſtructed in the true Religion.

There was therefore a Time, when all the People in the World were well vers'd in moral Virtue, and worſhip'd God according to the true Religion.

He therefore that gives a *later* Account of the Origin of moral Virtue, gives a *falſe* Account of it.

Now

Now as all parts of the World were by degrees inhabited, by the Deſcendants of ſuch Anceſtors, as were well inſtructed both in Religion and Morality, it is morally impoſſible that there ſhould be any Nation of the World, amongſt whom there was no Remains of Morality, no Inſtances of Virtue, no Principles of Religion deriv'd from their Anceſtors.

At leaſt it is abſolutely impoſſible for you to ſhew that there was any ſuch Nation, free from all Impreſſions of Religion, and Morality. This you can no more do, than you can ſhew that all the World are not deſcended from *Adam*.

So that your *Origin of moral Virtue* ſuppoſes a State of Man, which the Scriptures make it morally impoſſible ever to happen, and which it is abſolutely impoſſible for you to ſhew, that it really did ever happen.

But ſuppoſing ſome of the Poſterity of *Noah* in ſome Corner of the World ſhould have become ſo degenerate, as to have not the leaſt Remains of Virtue or Religion left amongſt them; and ſuppoſe ſome Philoſophers ſhould get amongſt them, and wheedle and flatter them into ſome Notions of Morality: could that be call'd an Account of the *Origin* of moral Virtue, when moral Virtue from the beginning of the World had been practis'd and taught,

by

by the virtuous Anceſtors of ſuch a depraved Offspring?

To make the taming of ſome ſuch ſuppos'd Savage Creatures the *Origin of Morality*, is as juſt a way of thinking, as to make the Hiſtory of the curing People in *Bedlam*, a true Account of the *Origin of Reaſon.*

3*dly*. Your Apology to your ſcrupulous Reader, as if your Origin of Morality related not to Jews or Chriſtians, is falſe and abſurd.

Becauſe, the Obſervations, which you have made upon human Nature, on which, your Origin of moral Virtue is founded, are only ſo many Obſervations upon the Manners of *all Orders* of *Chriſtians*. It is their Falſeneſs, Hypocriſie, Pride and Paſſion, that has induc'd you to conſider Morality, as having no rational Foundation in Mans Nature, but as the *political offſpring which Flattery begot upon Pride.*

And yet, you *good Man*, are not talking about *Chriſtians* or *Jews*.

But every Page of your Book confutes that Excuſe, and indeed needs muſt; for how ſhould your Obſervations relate to any but to thoſe People, whoſe Natures and Practices have furniſh'd you with them?

I have, ſay you, *ſearched through every Degree and Station of Men*, at laſt you tell

tell us, you went to the *Converts*, but even there you found that all was *Farce* and *Hypocriſy* *.

You tell us alſo, that whoever ſearches thus deep into *human Nature* will find, *that moral Virtue is the political offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.* Yet this ſearching into all Orders of Men, into Convents, and from thence making this Diſcovery, that Morality is all owing to *Pride* and *Policy*, yet this is not pronouncing any thing upon Chriſtians.

Nothing can be more weak than to form your Opinion of human Nature, upon the Tempers and Practices of all Orders of Chriſtians, and then pretend you are only treating of Man in ſuch a State of Nature, as you never ſaw one in, in your Life.

For how can your Obſervations upon Men, under the power of Education, Cuſtom, Laws and Religion, tell you what Man is, in a ſuppoſed State, where all theſe are wanting?

Or will you ſay that you are acquainted, and intimately acquainted with Men, ſo entirely diveſted of all the Ideas of Religion, Morality and Virtue, that you can make their Natures a true Specimen of Man in his moſt ſavage, brutal Condition?

Tho'

* P. cclxiii.

Tho' your Knowledge of human Nature was great, yet you was forced it ſeems, to viſit the *Convents*, before you could pronounce any thing of them. It ſeems therefore neceſſary, in order to know what Creatures Men are in a State of brutality, deſtitute of all Senſe of God and Virtue, that you ſhould know where to viſit them.

Again, this *Apology* of yours, happens to be inconſiſtent with the firſt and main principle upon which your fine Diſcourſe is founded. I mean your Definition of *Man*, whom you define to be, beſides *Skin*, *Fleſh*, and *Bones*, &c. *a compound of various Paſſions*. This is the vile, abominable, falſe, proud *Animal*, that you treat of under the Name of Man. In your Excuſe you tell us, this is Man only in a State *of Nature*, but in your Introduction, you tell us, that to forbear complimenting, that Definition belongs both to *your ſelf, and the courteous Reader*.

So that you muſt either allow, that you and your courteous Readers are all Savages, in an unenlightned State of Nature, or elſe that the Man you have deſcrib'd, belongs to all Orders of Chriſtians.

Having ſhewn the weakneſs and folly of your Apology, I proceed now to your more particular Account of the *Origin of moral Virtue*.

You

You are pleaſed to impute its Origin to *Pride* alone, that having the ſame Cauſe as fine Cloaths, we may wear as much, or as little as we pleaſe, without incurring any greater Offence, than a little variation in Dreſs.

If *Pride* be the only foundation of Virtue, then the more vicious any one is, the more humble he ought to be eſteem'd; and he who is the moſt humble is at the greateſt diſtance he can be plac'd from moral Virtue. And a perfect Humility (which by moſt Moraliſts has been reckon'd a Virtue) muſt according to this Account, render any one incapable of any Virtue, for ſuch a one not only wants that which you make the only cauſe of Virtue, but is poſſeſs'd of the contrary Quality.

Having carefully conſider'd human Nature, you have at laſt diſcover'd, that *the moral Virtues are the political offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride*,

You are ſo fond of this Diſcovery, that you can't help ſhewing us how you made it.

The firſt Moraliſts or Philoſophers, ſay you, *thoroughly examin'd all the Strength and Frailty of our Nature*, and *obſerving that none were either ſo ſavage*, as not to be charm'd with Praiſe, *or ſo deſpicable, as patiently to bear Contempt; juſtly concluded, that Flattery, muſt be the powerful*

Argument that could be uſed to huma Creatures *.

What a Graphilac Deſcription is here! One would think that you had been an Eye witneſs to all that paſs'd, and that you had held the Candle to thoſe firſt Philoſophers when they were ſo carefully peeping into human Nature. You don't love to dwell upon little Matters, or elſe you could have told us the Philoſopher's Name, who firſt diſcover'd this *Flattery*; how long he look'd before he found it; how he prov'd it to be agreeable to Pride; what Diſputes happen'd upon the Occaſion; and how many Ages of the World had paſs'd, before this Conſultation of the Philoſophers.

But however, you paſs on to more material Points: *They*, ſay you, (that is the Philoſophers) *making uſe of this bewitching Engine, extoll'd the Excellency of our Nature above other Animals, Having by this artful way of Flattery, inſinuated themſelves into the Hearts of Men, they began to inſtruct them in the Notions of Honour and Shame,——they laid before them how unbecoming it was the Dignity of ſuch ſublime Creatures to be ſollicitous about gratifying thoſe Appetites, which they had in common with Brutes*, &c.

This

* 29.

This you take to be a ſufficient Proof, *that the moral Virtues are the political offſpring which Flattery begot upon Pride.*

I can go no farther till I preſent you with a fine Speculation of an *Abſtract-thinker*, upon the *Origin of the erect poſture of Mankind.*

" It was his Opinion, that the nearer " we ſearch into human Nature, the more " we ſhall be convinc'd, that walking upon " our Feet with our Body erect, was the " *political offspring which Flattery begot* " *upon Pride.*

" The firſt Legiſlators, ſays he, having " examined the Strength and Weakneſs of " Man's Body, they diſcover'd, that he was " not ſo top heavy, but that he might " ſtand upright on his Feet, but the diffi- " culty was how to raiſe him up.

" Some Philoſopher more ſagacious than " the reſt found out, that though Man crept " on the Ground, yet he was made up of " Pride, and that if Flattery took hold of " that, he might eaſily be ſet on his Legs.

" Making uſe of this bewitching Engine, " they extoll'd the excellency of his Shape " above other Animals, and told him what " a groveling thing it was, to creep on all " four like the meaneſt Animals.

" Thus did theſe firſt Philoſophers ſhame " poor Man out of his natural State of creep- " ing, and wheedled him into the Digni-

" ty and Honour of walking upright, to " ſerve their own ambitious Ends, and that " they might have his Hands to be em- " ploy'd in their Drudgery ".

This Gentleman being deeply learn'd in the Knowledge of human Nature, has much the ſame Curioſities, concerning the Origin of Speech, and the firſt Invention of Truth, which he thinks upon a ſtrict Reſearch into Nature, may very juſtly be aſcrib'd to Pride and Flattery.

But to return to your Hiſtory. The next Thing your Philoſophers did, was this.

In order to introduce an Emulation amongſt Men, they divided the whole Species into two Claſſes, vaſtly differing from one another. The one conſiſted of vile groveling Wretches, which they ſaid was the Droſs of their Kind, and having only the Shape of Men, differ'd from Brutes only in their outward Figure; but the other Claſs of Men were made up of high Spirited lofty Creatures.*

Chronology, and Geography, I preſume, are Studies not polite enough for your Attention, or elſe I ſuppoſe you would have told us the Time when, and the Place where all this happen'd.

For it is material to know what the World was doing before theſe Philoſophers

* p. xxx.

phers made this Diviſion; whether before this, there was any Fear of God, any Belief of a Providence, any Duty to Parents, any Senſe of Equity, any Notions of Faith, or any Regard to Truth.

For if the Enquiry was about the Origin of *Seeing*, or *Hearing*, and you ſhould be ever ſo exact in telling me the manner how ſome cunning Philoſophers firſt brought that Matter to bear, I ſhould be very ſcrupulous about it, unleſs you told me the Time when, and the Place where they met, what they were doing before, how they came thither, and how they knew when they were there.

Now there is juſt this ſame Difficulty in your Account of the *Origin of moral Virtue*.

For, let me tell you, Sir, *moral Virtue* came amongſt Men, in the ſame manner, as *Seeing*, and *Hearing* came amongſt them.

Had there ever been a Time, when there was nothing of it in the World, it could no more have been introduc'd, than the Faculties of *Seeing* and *Hearing* could have been contriv'd by Men, who were *blind* and *deaf*.

Were not the firſt Principles and Reaſons of Morality connatural to us, and eſſential to our Minds, there would have been nothing for the moral Philoſophers to have improv'd upon.

Nor

Nor indeed can any Art or Science be form'd, but in ſuch Matters, as where Nature has taken the firſt Steps her ſelf, and ſhewn certain Principles to proceed upon. *Perſpective* ſuppoſes an agreement in the different Appearances of Objects.

Muſick ſuppoſes a confeſs'd Perception of various Sounds, and *moral Philoſophy* ſuppoſes an acknowledg'd difference of Good and Evil.

Were we not all naturally *Mathematicians* and *Logicians*, there would be no ſuch Sciences; for Science is only an improvement of thoſe firſt Principles or Ways of thinking which Nature has given us.

Take away the Mathematicians *Poſtulata*, or thoſe firſt Elements and Principles of Reaſon, which are allow'd by the common Senſe of Mankind; and were Philoſophers even as cunning as your ſelf, they muſt give up all the Science.

Do but ſuppoſe *all* to be invented, and then it will follow that *nothing* could be invented in any Science.

It is thus in all Sciences, the rationality of our Nature contains the firſt Rules, or Principles, and it is the Speculation of Man that builds and enlarges upon them.

As the Mathematician, ſeeing the acknowledg'd Differences and Proportions of Lines and Figures, proceeded upon them

to

to enlarge Men's Knowledge in ſuch matters; ſo the moral Philoſophers, ſeeing the acknowledg'd Difference between Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, which the common Reaſon of Man conſented to, they proceeded to enlarge and improve upon them,

So that their Labours are but Speculations and Harangues upon thoſe common Principles of Morality, which were as connatural to the Reaſon of Man, as the firſt Principles of any other Science.

Moral Philoſophy may be compar'd to *Eloquence*; it is an Improvement upon the common Reaſon of Man, as Eloquence is an Improvement upon Speech.

Now ſhould ſome *Connoſſieur* take it into his Head to enquire into the *Origin of Speech*, and tell the World, "That once "upon a time, ſome *Orators* ſeeing that "Man hand ſomething in his Mouth, by "the Movement of which, he could make "a particular Sound; they told him of the "Dignity and Honour of uttering ſuch "Sounds, and ſo through the pride of his "Nature taught the *Animal* to ſpeak, tho' "in reality, it was neither natural to him, "nor any true Excellence; but ambitious "Men flatter'd him into it, that he might "be the fitter to go on their Errands".

Should any profound Thinker give this Account of the *Origin of Speech*, you would have

have a Right to ſay, that he had ſtole the Diſcovery from you, who have given us juſt the ſame falſe and ridiculous Account of the *Origin* of Morality.

For it is full as reaſonable, to make Eloquence the *Origin* of forming *articulate Sounds*, as to make the Harangues or Labours of moral Philoſophers, *the Origin of moral Virtue*.

Could it be ſuppos'd, that an Underſtanding ſo *fine* as yours, cou'd be convey'd to your *Deſcendants*, and that you ſhould ever have a *Grandſon* as *wiſe* as your ſelf: It may be expected that he will be able to teach that Generation of Men, that *Seeing*, was firſt introduc'd into the World, by Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s Treatiſe upon *Opticks*.

To enquire into the Origin of moral Virtue, is to enquire into the Origin of *Reaſon, Truth*, and the *Relations* of Things.

And to fanſy that ſome Politicians contriv'd moral Virtue, is to fanſy that ſome Politician contriv'd *Reaſon* and Truth, and invented the difference between one Action and another.

There is nothing that began to be, but what may be deſtroy'd or ceaſe to be; but as Truth and Reaſon can never ceaſe to be, ſo it implies a Contradiction in terms, for Truth and Reaſon ever to have had a Beginning.

It is the ſame in moral Virtue, which is *Truth* and *Reaſon*, conſider'd in relation to Actions; and the difference between one Action and another, is as immutable and eternal, as the difference between one Line and another, and can no more be deſtroy'd.

As *things* are different by their own proper Natures, independant of our Wills, ſo *Actions* have their own peculiar Qualities from themſelves, and not from our Thoughts about them. In theſe immutable Qualities of Actions, is founded, the fitneſs and reaſonableneſs of them, which we can no more alter, than we can change the Proportions or Relations of Lines and Figures.

And it is no more the *Pride* of Man, that has made this difference between *Actions*, than it is the *Pride* of Man, that makes the difference between a *Circle* and a *Square*.

Moral Virtue therefore, if conſider'd in it ſelf, as the Rule or Law of intelligent Beings, had *no Origin*; that is, there never was a time when it began to be; but it is as much without beginning as Truth and Goodneſs, which are in their Natures as Eternal as God.

But Moral Virtue, if conſider'd, as the Object of Man's Knowledge, began with the firſt Man, and is as natural to him, as it is natural to Man to think and perceive,

or feel the difference between Pleaſure and Pain.

For his rational Nature, as much implies a fitneſs to perceive a difference in Actions, as to Right and Wrong, as it implies a fitneſs to perceive a difference in things as to great and ſmall, pleaſing or painful.

It may now be enquired, whether this moral Virtue be our *Law*, and how it appears, that we are under any Obligations to behave our ſelves, according to this difference of *Right* and *Wrong* that appears in Actions.

Now the reaſonableneſs and fitneſs of Actions themſelves is a Law to rational Beings, and the ſight of that reaſonableneſs carries an Obligation.

The different magnitude of things, is a Reaſon to us, to acknowledge ſuch Difference; and He that affirms any thing contrary to the ſight of his Mind, offends againſt the Law of his Nature.

The different natures of *Actions*, is a Reaſon for us to act according to ſuch Differences, and He who does any thing contrary to the ſight of his Mind in that reſpect, ſins againſt the Law of his Nature.

Now that this is not an imaginary Obligation, or a Law fanſy'd by Moraliſts, may appear from hence; that this is a Law to which even the Divine Nature is ſubject; for God is neceſſarily Juſt and Good, not from

from any external Force, but from the Excellency of Juſtice and Goodneſs. *Reaſon* is his Law becauſe it is *Reaſon*. That therefore which is a Law to God becauſe of its Excellency, muſt ſurely be a *Law* to all Beings whom he has created capable of diſcerning that Excellency. For if the Reaſon or Excellence of the thing, be of ſufficient Force to determine the Action of God, certainly it ought not to be thought too little to determine us in our Actions.

Nor can that be ſaid to be an imaginary ſpeculative Law to intelligent Beings, which is an inviolable Law to the moſt perfect, intelligent Nature.

2*dly*, It is the Will of God, that makes moral Virtue our Law, and obliges us to act reaſonably.

If you ask how this Will of God appears, I muſt beg leave at preſent, only to ſuppoſe, that God is of infinite Juſtice, and Goodneſs, and Truth; and then the thing proves it ſelf: For ſuch a God muſt neceſſarily Will, that all his Creatures in their ſeveral Proportions, be Juſt and Good, and True.

Few Mathematical Demonſtrations conclude ſtronger than this. There is only one Objection to be made againſt it, which is to ſuppoſe, that God is neither Juſt or True.

If rather then yield, you will put the *Epicurean* upon me, and ſay that God may diſregard us, and neither Will one way, nor the other. It may be anſwer'd, that this is inconſiſtent with the Idea of God juſt laid down; for a God of infinite Goodneſs and Truth, can no more fail to Will Goodneſs and Truth in *every Inſtance*, than an infinite Being can fail to be preſent in every Place, or an omnipotent Being be deficient in any Acts of Power. So that it is abſolutely neceſſary to ſay, either that God, is not of infinite Goodneſs and Truth, or to allow that He requires all his Creatures in their ſeveral Capacities, to be Juſt, and True, and Good.

Here, Sir, is the Noble and Divine Origin of moral Virtue, it is founded in the immutable Relations of Things, in the Perfections and Attributes of God, and not in the *Pride* of Man, or the Craft of cunning Politicians.

As the Reaſons and Obligations to moral Virtue have always been in being, ſo has Mankind always had Sight of them: It being as eſſential and natural, for a rational Being to perceive theſe differences of Actions, as it is for an extended Being to occupy Space.

And the Creation of a rational Nature, as much implies a Sight of the reaſonableneſs of things, as the Creation of an extended

tended Being, implies its Poſſeſſion of ſo much Space.

Matter of Fact alſo ſupports this Obſervation: For Hiſtory tells us of no Age or Country, where Men have not agreed to aſcribe, Juſtice, Goodneſs and Truth, to the Supreme Being.

Now this ſhews, that they always not only knew, what Goodneſs, Juſtice and Truth were, but alſo that they took them to be ſuch excellent Qualities, as ought to be aſcrib'd to the higheſt and beſt Being.

How monſtrous is it therefore, to impute theſe fine moral Virtues to the Contrivance of Politicians, when all Ages of the World have agreed to aſcribe them to God, and number them amongſt his glorious Attributes.

God is Juſt, therefore there is ſuch a thing as Juſtice, independent of the Will and Contrivance of Man, is a way of reaſoning that cannot be refuted.

It is in vain to ſay, that there may be a Divine Juſtice and Goodneſs, and yet what we call Goodneſs and Juſtice amongſt Men may be only a human Contrivance.

For to this it may be anſwer'd, that we cannot aſcribe any thing to God, of which we have not ſome Conception our ſelves. Did we not perceive ſome degrees of Wiſdom, we could not call him *All-wiſe*; did we not feel Power, and underſtand what it is,

we

we could not aſcribe *Omnipotence* to God. For our Idea of God is only form'd by adding *infinite* to every Perfection that we have any Knowledge of.

So that had we not from the rationality of our Nature, as plain a Sight of Juſtice, Goodneſs and Truth, as we have of *Power*, *Exiſtence*, or any thing elſe, we could not attribute them to God.

That we are rational Beings, is as plain, as that we have Bodies, and bodily Senſes. As there is no Man ſo refin'd and elevated, but gives frequent Proof, that He is ſubject alſo to Inſtincts and Paſſions; ſo there is no one ſo addicted to an Animal Life, as to ſhew no Signs of an higher Principle within him.

It is this rationality of our Nature, that makes us both capable of, and oblig'd to practiſe moral Virtue, and brings us into a kind of Society with God and all other intelligent Beings.

For our Reaſon gives us a ſhare in that common Light, which all intelligent Beings enjoy, and by making us Partakers of the ſame Things, ſo far makes us of one Society.

By our Reaſon we know ſome Truths, which God, and all intelligent Beings know; and apprehend ſome Perfections, and different Qualities in Things and Actions, which all intelligent Beings apprehend.

Now

Now by being let into this Region of Truth, by being able to ſee ſome Truths which God alſo ſees, and to know ſome Perfections which he alſo knows, we are as plainly declar'd to be rational Beings, and that Reaſon is one Law of our Nature; as the Principles of Fleſh and Blood ſhew us to be Animals, and ſubject to the Inſtincts of an Animal Life.

For how weak is it to ſuppoſe, that the *Animal* Life ſhould be the Foundation of Laws of Nature, ſo as to make it fit for us to act agreeable to its Wants and Deſires; and that the *Rationality* of our *Beings*, which is, in ſome degree, a Likeneſs to God, ſhould be the Foundation of no Laws of Nature, ſo as to make it fit for us to act ſuitable to its Perfection and Happineſs.

The ſhort is this, *Truth* and *Reaſon* is the Law by which God acts; Man is, in ſome degree, made a Partaker of that Truth and Reaſon; therefore it is a Law to him alſo. The more we act according to Order, Truth and Reaſon, the more we make our ſelves like God, who is Truth and Reaſon it ſelf.

This is the ſtrong and immoveable Foundation of *moral Virtue*, having the ſame Certainty as the Attributes of God. —

Away then, I beſeech you, with your idle and prophane Fancies about the *Origin*

of

of moral Virtue. For once turn your Eyes towards Heaven, and dare but to own a juſt and good God, and then you have own'd the true Origin of Religion and moral Virtue.

Thus much will, I preſume, be thought ſufficient to vindicate the Excellency and Obligations of *moral Virtue* from the falſe and impious Accounts you have given of its Origin.

I proceed to conſider in the next place ſome other Methods that are made uſe of to render *moral Virtue* odious and contemptible.

SECT. II.

THE moſt boaſted Objection againſt the Reality of Virtue which is urged by Men, who appropriate the Knowledge of human Nature to themſelves, is this, that no Action is perform'd by us thro' a *Love of Goodneſs*, or upon a rational Principle of Virtue, but that it is *Complexion, natural Temper, Education, Pride, Shame*, or ſome other blind Impulſe that moves us in all our Actions that have the Appearance of Virtue. Thus a Man who relieves an Object of Compaſſion, only gratifies his *commiſerating Temper*; he is ſubject to *Pity, which is a Frailty of our Natures, and of which the weakeſt Minds have generally the greateſt Share,*

*Share, as may be ſeen in Women and Children**. Again, *the humbleſt Man alive*, ſay you, *muſt confeſs, that the Reward of a virtuous Action, which is the Satisfaction that enſues upon it, conſiſts in a certain Pleaſure he procures to himſelf in contemplating his own Worth; which Pleaſure, together with the Occaſion of it, are as certain Signs of Pride, as looking pale and trembling at any imminent Danger are the Symptoms of Fear*†.

Now, Sir, if this be a true Account of the *humbleſt Men alive*, then, by the Rule of Contraries, this muſt be a true Account of the *proudeſt Man alive, that the Satisfaction he enjoys in being ſo, conſiſts in a certain Pleaſure he procures to himſelf by contemplating his own Vileneſs.*

This accurate Deſcription you have given us of the *Pleaſure of the humbleſt Man alive*, muſt be owing to ſuch a feeling Senſe as the *blind Man* had of *Light*, who being ask'd what it was like; anſwer'd, that it was like the *Sound of a Trumpet.*

But to conſider this Charge againſt human Virtue, that it is nothing but Education, natural Temper, or Complexion; this being ſo labour'd a Point, I ſhall ſtate the whole Matter as clearly as I can.

1*ſt*, It is granted, that an Action is only then virtuous when it is perform'd, becauſe

* p. xlii. † p. xliii.

it is agreable to Reaſon, and thoſe Laws which God requires us to obſerve.

Now this Virtue is Man's Duty, not as a Task that is impos'd upon him, but as it is the only Practice, that is, the natural Pleaſure and proper Good of his being.

Virtue having that natural Fitneſs to a rational Soul that fine Sights have to the Eye, or harmonious Sounds to the Ear.

A rational Being is in order, in its right State and Frame, when it is acting reaſonably.

The infinite Goodneſs of God makes him infinitely happy, and the Perfection of every Being is its Happineſs, and the greater and more perfect the Virtue of any one is, the more perfect is his Happineſs.

Now it is here to be obſerv'd, that an Action is not leſs virtuous, or loſes any of its Excellency, becauſe the Soul is delighted and made happy by it; for it is the very Nature of Virtue to produce ſuch Effects, and it ſhews the Rectitude of the Soul, when it can act virtuouſly with Delight, and feel its Happineſs in ſo doing.

This is being virtuous upon Principle, and thro' a *Love of Goodneſs*; for Goodneſs is lov'd for itſelf, when it is lov'd for what it is, the true Good and proper Delight of a rational Being.

Now will any one ſay that there is no Excellence in Virtue, that it is mere *Nature* and

and *Temper*, becauſe it is ſo agreable, ſo proper to our rational Natures? Then let him ſay there is no Excellence in the Goodneſs and Juſtice of God, becauſe it is ſo ſuitable to his Nature, and conſtitutes his Happineſs.

Granting therefore that Virtue was its own Reward, as it elevates and perfects the Soul, and keeps it in a State of right enjoyment, it would not be the leſs reaſonable, on that Account.

For Happineſs is the only reaſonable *End* of every Being.

An Action is not good, or virtuous, becauſe it is *Self-denial*, but becauſe it is according to Duty; and he who thro' long habits of Goodneſs, has made the Practice of Virtue to have leſs of Self-denial in it, is the moſt virtuous Man.

Now, it is no Objection againſt the *Reality* of Goodneſs, that as rational Beings, we are *naturally* and *complexionally* diſpos'd to practiſe and delight in it; or that this natural Diſpoſition, may by Exerciſe, Meditation, and Habits be heighten'd and encreas'd.

For Cuſtom, Habit, and natural Temper are proper Aſſiſtances of our moſt virtuous Actions, and cannot be ſaid to make them leſs reaſonable, unleſs it be a Fault or Imperfection, to be habitually and ſtrongly diſpos'd to Goodneſs,

Thus much therefore is true of us consider'd only as *rational Beings*; that we must even in that State be by Nature and Temper form'd to perceive Pleasure, from some particular ways of acting; and that the very excellence of our Natures, consists in a Fitness and Disposition for virtuous Actions, which the more we improve and strengthen by Meditation and Habit, the more reasonable we make our selves,

It has pleas'd God in the Formation of Man, so to unite this rational Nature to a Body of Flesh and Blood, that they shall generally act together; and that the Soul shall as well be influenc'd by bodily Instincts, and Motions of the Blood and Spirits, as by its own Thoughts and Reflections.

Thus, a delightful Thought conceiv'd ever so secretly in the Mind, shall at its first Conception, have the Blood and Spirits joyn in the Pleasure.

So that every right Judgment of the Mind, every proper Aversion or regular Love, has as much the Concurrence of the Blood and Spirits, as if they were the only Agents.

The Body being thus visible an Agent in all that we do, has made some weak Heads imagine, that we are nothing else but Body; As from the same want of Thought some have concluded, that there is nothing besides the material World, because nothing else is obvious to their Eyes.

The

The Soul being thus united to the Body, no Act of the Man is leſs reaſonable, or virtuous, becauſe it has the Concurrance of the Blood and Spirits: For this was the Intendment of the Union, that a Creature of ſuch a Form, ſhould exert its Inſtincts and Paſſions in conformity to Reaſon. For Inſtance,

Suppoſe any one, ſhould meditate upon the Attributes and Perfections of God, till the great Idea had rais'd and warm'd his Spirits: tho' the Reflection is then ſupported by the Agitation of bodily Spirits, yet the Meditation is not leſs religious, or leſs devout, or reaſonable, becauſe the Heat of bodily Spirits aſſiſted in it.

Suppoſe any one ſhould ſo often reflect upon an eternal ſtate of Darkneſs, and Separation from God, till his Blood and Spirit joyn in increaſing the Horror; ſuch an Horror would not be leſs reaſonable, becauſe the Body join'd in keeping it up.

The Mechanical Influence which our Spirits and temperament have upon our Actions, does not take away from the reaſonableneſs of them, any more than the rational Frame of our Minds, which is naturally diſpos'd to acquieſce in the reaſon of things, deſtroys the reaſonableneſs of Actions.

As it would be no Excellence in a pure thinking Being, to be equally inclin'd to Truth or Falſhood, ſo it would add no Merit to ſuch a mixt Nature as ours is, if

our

our Bodily temperaments were neither more or leſs inclin'd to, or delighted with one ſort of Actions than another.

Let us only ſuppoſe, that a rational Soul and an animal Nature, were united to act in a State of Perſonality.

It cannot be, that the reaſonableneſs of its Actions ſhould be impair'd by the Body's appearing to have a ſhare in them, becauſe, it does not act according to its Nature, unleſs the Body does concur; and in ſuch a mixt Being, it is no more requir'd that its Actions ſhould be perform'd abſtractly by pure Reaſon, than it is allow'd that its Motions ſhould be merely Animal.

Yet this is the falſe Judgment which Men, who are not the greateſt Friends of Virtue, make, becauſe the Influence of the animal Nature is viſible in the beſt of Men; and becauſe ſuch Enquirers generally converſe intimately only with the worſt, they raſhly conclude againſt *all Force* of Principle, and deny Reaſon to have *any* Share in our Actions.

From what has been ſaid, we may eaſily ſupport the *Reality* of Virtue from all the Objections of theſe *Criticks* upon human Nature.

For, granting the Force of Education, the Power of Cuſtom, and the Influence of our bodily Inſtincts and Tempers; yet nothing can thence be concluded againſt the Share

Share that Reaſon and Principle are requir'd to have in our Actions.

For both Reaſon and Religion direct us to uſe the Influence and Aſſiſtance of all theſe Helps; and conſequently they no more leſſen or take from the Reality of virtuous Actions, when we are aſſiſted by them, than *Faſting* or *Prayer* make our Piety leſs excellent, becauſe it was aſſiſted by them.

And it is as ſuitable to our Natures to ſtrengthen and eſtabliſh our Virtue, by Education, Cuſtom, Complexion, and bodily Inſtincts, as it is ſuitable to Religion, to improve and heighten it by Faſting and Prayer.

And he who ſays, that ſuch or ſuch Actions have no Principle of Virtue or Religion in them, becauſe they are made eaſy by Education, Temper and Practice, thinks as weakly, as if he ſhould affirm, that ſuch Actions have no Reality of Principle in them, becauſe they are the Effects of Meditation, and Habits of Attention; for good Habits of Body no more leſſen the Excellence of Virtue, than good Habits of Mind.

An Action is virtuous, becauſe it is an Obedience to Reaſon, and the Laws of God; and does not ceaſe to be ſo, becauſe the Body is either form'd by Uſe, or created by Diſpoſition, eaſy and ready for the Performance of it

A good

A good Education would be a Sin, if the Benefit that is received from it, or the Facility of performing good Actions, took away from their Goodneſs.

Nay, all Habits of Virtue would, upon this foot, be blameable, becauſe ſuch Habits muſt be ſuppos'd to have render'd both Body and Mind more ready and exact in Goodneſs.

All theſe Abſurdities neceſſarily follow from this Argument, that there is no virtuous Principle in our good Actions, becauſe Cuſtom, Education, Temper, and Complexion, have their Share in them.

2*dly*, This Objection againſt the Reality of Virtue, is rather a Calumny, than any juſt Charge againſt it.

For, as it is as certain, that we think and reaſon, as that we are ſubject to bodily Inſtincts and Habits, nothing can prove that our Reaſon and Reflection do not principally concur in any Action, but the Impoſſibility of it. He therefore that would prove that my Mind does not act upon a Principle of Reaſon, where he thinks that Temper or Complexion may carry me thro' it, can never prove it, till he can ſhew that there was no Principle of Reaſon, no proper Motive, no Precept of Duty to move me to it: For if there be a plain Reaſon in the Thing, if there be a Precept of Duty to excite

excite my Mind, as well as a natural Diſpoſition in my Temper to perform the Action, it is impoſſible for the moſt penetrating Genius to prove that my Temperament had a greater Share in the Action, than the Reaſon of my Mind; and conſequently this Objection is a mere Calumny, and an ill-natur'd Suſpicion, which can never prove it ſelf to be juſtly made.

Now, that Reaſon is the chief Principle in the Performance of good Actions, may, in ſome degree, be learnt from hence, That reaſonable and wiſe Actions never occaſion any Sorrow or Repentance in the Mind; but, on the contrary, in violent Actions, where the Fermentation of the Blood and Spirits may be ſuppos'd to have blindly hurried on the Action, that Fermentation is no ſooner abated, but there ariſes a Pain in the Mind, and Reaſon condemns the Action; which Condemnation chiefly conſiſts in this, that Reaſon had not the Guidance of it; which is a plain Confeſſion, that it is the way of our Nature to have Reaſon govern the Inſtincts and Motions of the Spirits, and that ſhe ſhrinks and is uneaſy at thoſe Actions where ſhe was not the principal Agent.

If therefore Actions only ſatisfy and content us, by being approv'd by our Reaſon, it is a manifeſt Proof that our Reaſon is the principal Agent in our good Actions.

Nor will it be any Objection to this, to ſay, that many People are ſatisfy'd with falſe Notions of Virtue and Religion; for this only ſhews that the Principle of Reaſon may be weak, and of very little diſcerning Force in ſome People; but ſtill it is their Faculty of Reaſon, ſuch as it is, that gives them Peace, when it preſides; and it is living contrary to Reaſon, that gives them Pain, as it gives Pain to others who enjoy a more enlighten'd Mind.

If the religious *Turk* abhors the Abomination of Wine, it cannot be ſaid, that ſuch Abhorrence is only the Effect of Temper, bodily Inſtincts, and Cuſtom; unleſs it could be ſhewn that he would equally abhor it, tho' he was fully perſuaded that *Mahomet* was a Cheat.

From this Account of human Nature, we may be able to reject all thoſe Reproaches which are caſt upon Virtue and Religion, as if they were never founded upon any rational Principle, but were the caſual blind Effect of Cuſtom, Education, Temper, or Complexion.

1*ſt*. As it appears, that in our rational Natures, we are naturally and complexionally form'd to practiſe and delight in reaſonable Actions, and that ſuch a Tendency of Temper or Nature towards Virtue, no more leſſens the Excellency of it, than the Rectitude

Rectitude of God's Nature, takes away the Excellence of his Actions.

2*dly*, That Actions are not less virtuous for being suitable to any Disposition, whether natural or acquir'd, than for being suitable to the Reason of the Mind.

3*dly*, That *Education*, *Custom*, *Habits*, *Complexion*, &c. Are so far from taking away the Reasonableness of our Actions, that we could not be said to act reasonably, unless we endeavour'd to make a greater Progress in Virtue by their Assistance.

4*thly*, That it is impossible, even in those Actions; where *Custom*, *Education*, *Complexion*, and *Habit* seem to be in full Power, for any one to prove that Reason and Principle have not the greatest Share in them.

5*thly*, That Peace of Mind, which attends our good Actions, is a plain Proof of the Power which our Reason had in the Performance of them.

To come now to a particular Instance or Two.

1*st*. *Philo's Charity* and *Compassion* is no Virtue, you say, because it is mere Complexion and Temper; he gratifies his *Pity*,

and acts in Conformity to his Blood and Spirits.

Now this is so far from proving that he has not the Virtue of Charity, that it might be urg'd as a Proof of his having it.

For his Body is in that Disposition that it should be, supposing that his Mind had been long exercis'd and endued with Habits of Charity; it gives that farther Pleasure in charitable Acts, which the right Turn of the Instincts, and Blood and Spirits, should give to the Mind in every virtuous Action.

For as I have observ'd, Man is then in his best State, when the Course of the Blood and Spirits act in Concurrence with his Reason; so that when my Body, with its *Instincts* and *Motions*, joyns with the right Judgments of my Mind, what I so perform has all the Perfection that an human Creature is able to exert.

This Complexion, therefore, or bodily Disposition towards charitable Acts, is so far from implying that therefore the Mind has no Share in the Action, that were the Mind in its best State, and in its full Power, (as at first created) it would use a greater and more constant Concurrence of all bodily Tempers in the Performance of her Duty.

So that when Complexion, or bodily Temperament readily joyn in the Performance

mance of good Actions, this is ſo far from implying any Defect of Principle, or want of rational Motive, that is ſhews, in ſome degree, the Remains of that primitive Rectitude of Body and Mind before the *Fall.*

2*dly*, To ſay that *Philo's* Charity is mere Complexion, is a Calumny, and groundleſs Accuſation; it is a Suſpicion as ill-grounded, as if I was to ſuſpect that a Man had no Pride in his Mind, becauſe there appear'd an Haughtineſs in his Carriage; or no Humility within, becauſe of a natural Lowlineſs without: It is a Suſpicion thus founded againſt all the Appearances of Truth, and is forc'd to make thoſe the Proofs of the Abſence of a Thing, which are the natural Signs of its Preſence.

And as it is thus unreaſonable, ſo is it utterly impoſſible that it ſhould ever juſtify it ſelf.

For ſeeing it is not only poſſible, but natural for this complexional Diſpoſition to act in Conformity to the internal Principle of the Mind, it can never be proved that it does not.

It can never be proved, that Reaſon and Religion have not a greater Share in *Philo's* Charity, than his Complexion. How far ſome Precept of Religion, ſome Principle of Reaſon may influence his Mind, cannot be known by the moſt ſagacious Philoſopher; there-

therefore the Charge againſt his Charity, as the mere Effect of Complexion, muſt be always ill-natur'd, unjuſt, and groundleſs.

Farther, granting that *Philo* was complexionally diſpoſed to Pity and Compaſſion, even before he could be ſuppoſed to act upon a Principle of Virtue and Religion; yet even this Suppoſition will make nothing againſt it afterwards,

For will any one argue, that a Man can never fear, love, or hate, upon Principles of Reaſon, becauſe Children fear, love, and hate, before Reaſon is of any Force to direct them?

Yet this is as wiſe, as to ſuppoſe that a Man's Complexion is never made to concur with a Principle of Reaſon, becauſe ſuch Complexion appear'd, before Reaſon could be ſuppoſed of ſufficient Power to guide it.

As to what you ſay, that *Pity is as much a Frailty of our Nature*, as *Anger*, *Pride*, &c. *That the weakeſt Minds have generally the greateſt Share of it, for which Reaſon none are more compaſſionate than Women and Children**.

Two Things may be obſerv'd, Firſt, the Inconſiſtency of this Aſſertion with the reſt of your Book,

Here

---

* p. xlii.

Here you derive the Compaſſion of Women, from a ſuppoſed *Weakneſs of Mind*; which ſuppoſes, that their *Tempers* depend upon their Minds, and are ſubject to them, and influenc'd by them; tho' in this very Page, you make *Pity* to be only an *Impulſe of Nature*, and it be your chief Deſign throughout your Book to ſhew, that all our Tempers and Paſſions are mere Mechaniſm, and *Conſtitution*, founded only in the Temper and Tone of our bodily Spirits.

So that according to your deep Philoſophy, *Pity* is only an Impulſe of Nature, and bodily Temper; yet Women are more pitiful than Men, becauſe they have (as you ſuppoſe) *weaker Minds*.

That is, their Minds, becauſe *weak*, have a Power over their Tempers, and form their Diſpoſitions; but Mens Minds being *ſtrong*, have no ſuch Power.

To what Temper of Mind ſuch Philoſophy as this is to be imputed, need not be obſerv'd.

2*dly*, To ſay that Woman have the *weakeſt Minds*, is ſaying more than you are able to prove. If they are more inclin'd to Compaſſion, through a Tenderneſs of Nature, it is ſo far from being a *Weakneſs of their Minds*, that it is a right Judgment, aſſiſted,

assisted, or made more easy by a happy Tenderness of their Constitutions.

And it is owing, perhaps, to this *Make* of their Spirits, that they are commonly more affected with the Truths of Religion, than the Generality of Men are.

When our Minds are once soften'd, by whatever Cause it is, we are generally in the best Disposition for the Impressions of Religion; so that *Pity* is so far from being *as much a Frailty*, as *Pride* and *Anger*, that they are as different in their Effects, as a *Heart of Flesh* and a *Heart of Stone*, which Holy Scripture makes as different as a *Blessing* and a *Curse*.

But to return (if this be a Digression) to my Subject.

Let us now farther suppose, that *Philo*'s Charity is greatly owing to his Nature and Complexion; that the quality of his Spirits began the Disposition, and helped to recommend this Virtue to the Mind; yet may such a Virtue be as truly rational and religious, as if it had been let into the Mind any other away,

Sickness, *Poverty*, and *Distress*, have a natural Tendency to correct our Follies, and convert our Minds towards our true Good. These Conditions of Life may make it as easy for a Man to be *humble* and *compassionate*, as any Bodily Complexion whatever; yet is such *Humility* and *Compassion* not to

be

be eſteem'd void of Principle or Reaſon, becauſe ſuch Cauſes contributed towards them, and led the Mind into them.

For the Mind is acting according to the trueſt Principles of Reaſon and Religion, when it makes Advantage of theſe external Helps, and turns *Eaſe* and *Pain*, *Sickneſs* and *Health*, into occaſional Cauſes of greater Piety.

Nor is it any more a Diminution of the Reality of *Philo*'s Charity, to ſay, that bodily Temper firſt prepar'd and inclin'd his Mind towards it, than it is a Diminution of the Reality of one's *Repentance*, to ſay, that it was ſome Misfortune or croſs Accident that firſt diſpoſed and fitted his Mind for it.

David ſaid (without fear of deſtroying the Reality of his Piety) *It is good for me, that I have been afflicted.*

Now if Actions, or Ways of Life may be good, tho' Afflictions contributed towards them, ſurely they may be equally good, tho' ſome Bodily Tempers proved in ſome degree the Occaſions of them.

And it is as conſiſtent with true and real Virtue, to owe its Riſe to ſome bodily Conſtitution or Temper, as it is conſiſtent with ſolid and ſubſtantial Piety, to owe its Beginning to ſome particular Calamity or Action of God's Providence.

But to proceed: It is farther objected, that *Philo*'s Charity muſt be *mere Complexion*,

and not Virtue; for if it were Virtue, he would not allow himself in the Neglect of other Duties.

This, again, is a false Conclusion? for a Man may perform one Duty upon a Principle of Virtue, and Sense of Duty, and yet thro' Mistake, or Negligence, be deficient in others.

Such great Judges of human Nature, should consider, that even in worldly Affairs, a Man does not always act up to the same Principle in every thing he does.

Will any one say, that *Avarus* does not consider Gain, when he is making Bargains, because at some other Times he seems not to value Expence?

If not, why then must *Philo* be look'd upon as not *at all* influenc'd by a Sense of Duty in his Acts of Charity, because at some other Times and Occasions, he seems not to be govern'd by it.

Our present State, is a State of great Weakness and Imperfection, and our Reason, weak as it is, has a Thousand Impediments to hinder and divert its Force. In the Affairs of Civil Life, we are neither perfectly wise, nor wholly foolish; and we are almost the same Men in the Things that relate to God. In some Instances, Reason and Religion get more Power over us, and guide us under a Sense of Duty; whilst in other Parts of our Life, it may be very apparent

parent that Reaſon has a leſs Share in our Actions.

But to conclude that Reaſon, or a Principle of Virtue, does not influence us in any Part of our Behaviour, becauſe it does not act equally and conſtantly in every other Part of our Lives; is as abſurd, as to affirm, that we don't *think* at all in any Thing that we do, becauſe we don't *think* with the ſame Exactneſs or Attention in every Thing that is done by us.

If *Philo* lives in the Neglect or Violation of ſome Duties, this ſhews that he is a weak, imperfect Man; but it does not ſhew that he is the *ſame* weak and imperfect Man, and as devoid of any Principle of Virtue, when he does his Duty, as where he neglects it: For it is as poſſible for him to be charitable upon a Principle of Duty, and yet fail in ſome other Reſpects, as it is poſſible for a Man to uſe his Reaſon in ſome Things, and not in others; or to reaſon right in ſome Points, and yield to Folly in others.

So that to impute Actions ſeemingly virtuous, ſolely to natural *Temper* or *Complexion*, or ſome other blind Motive, becauſe the Man is not uniform in his Life, is groundleſs and abſurd; all that can with any Truth be affirm'd of ſuch a Man, is this, that he is not uniform in his Actions, and that thro' ſome Miſtake, or Negligence,

he is not ſo careful of his Duty in ſome Reſpects as in others.

Our *Underſtanding* and *Reaſon*, even in Matters of mere Speculation, is well-nigh as weak and inconſtant, as in Points of Duty and Conſcience.

Few Syſtems of Philoſophy, but obtrude ſome Errors upon us with as much Aſſurance, as they affirm the Truth: *Deſcartes* aſſerted a *Plenum*; Sir *Iſaac Newton* has proved a *Vacuum*.

Now will any one ſay, that it was not the *Reaſon* or *Underſtanding* of *Deſcartes* that demonſtrated ſo many ſolid Truths, becauſe he yielded to Falſity and Error in the Doctrine of a *Plenum?* Yet it would be much more reaſonable to affirm this, in Matters of mere Speculation, than to affirm, that in Points of Practice and Duty, a Man is *in no Actions* govern'd by *Reaſon* and *Principle*, becauſe in *ſome* Inſtances he acts weakly, and not according to Reaſon.

For, produce but the true Reaſon why a Philoſopher may be ſaid to proceed in ſome Speculations according to ſtrict Reaſon and Truth, and yet hold ſome Tenets contrary to them, and then you will ſhew that it is poſſible, nay, highly probable, that a Man may, in ſome Points of Duty, act upon a Principle of Reaſon and Virtue, though in ſome Things he may ſwerve from them.

There

There is, I acknowledge, a great Difference in bodily Temperaments; ſo that one Man may be born with better Diſpoſitions for the Practice of ſome Virtues than others, yet it is Reaſon within, that is the chief Principle that actuates all of them; for the *fineſt Spirits* are things as blind and ſenſeleſs of themſelves, as the *Hands* and *Feet*, or the groſſer Parts of the Body.

Wit and *Underſtanding*, depend much upon bodily Temperaments; yet who is ſo weak as to imagine, that therefore the Reaſon of the Mind has no Share in Arts and Sciences.

It is the ſame in *Virtue*, or at leaſt, as to ſome particular Virtues; there may be a kind Diſpoſition in the animal Spirits to produce them, but it is great Weakneſs to ſuppoſe that Reaſon and Judgment, have no Part in them.

It is impoſſible for our ſtinted Capacities to explain or calculate the *exact* Powers, that are to be attributed to our Souls and Bodies in the Performance of Actions, becauſe we have no clear Ideas of them; but we know enough to affirm the united Operation of both, and to ſhew that he reaſons falſely, who would aſcribe an Action wholly to the Body, becauſe it appears to have ſome Share in it; becauſe, ſuppoſing it to take its Riſe wholly from *Reaſon*, the Union of the Soul and Body requires, that the Body ſhould appear

appear to have the ſame Part in the production of the Action.

There is nothing more various, imperceptible, or more out of our Sight, than the Motives of human Actions. We know no more how *Arguments*, *Opinions*, act upon the Mind, or how far they contribute to our *Choices*, than we can tell how far the *Air*, and how far the *Sun* operates in the Growth of Plants.

When a Free-Thinker aſſerts, that our *religious Beliefs and Perſuaſions are not at all the Cauſes of human Actions*, he proceeds upon as good Grounds, as if he had ſaid that *Air is not at all* the Cauſe of the Circulation of the Blood.

For it is as eaſy to ſhew that *Air* has no Influence upon our Bodies, as that *Reaſon* and *Opinions* have no Power over our Minds.

And it is more poſſible to tell how far the *Fluids*, and how far the *Solids* in an human Body contribute to bodily Action, than it is to affirm how far *Opinions* and *Judgments*, and how far *Temper* and *Complexion* operate in human Actions.

Nay, theſe Gentlemen, themſelves, to make their Philoſophy ſtill more ridiculous, are frequently wondering at the ſtrange and monſtrous *Contradictions*, which they think they diſcover in human Nature.

As

As if they ſhould ſay, that finding human Nature to be *unaccountable*, they therefore take upon them to give *certain* and *poſitive* Accounts of its manner of acting.

I ſhall be pardon'd for inſiſting ſo long upon this Article, becauſe it is that on which ſome celebrated *Wits* have ſpent ſo much Pains, to the Prejudice of Religion and Morality. It is not eaſy to imagine the fatal Effects that Mr. *Bayle*'s and *Eſprit*'s Writings have had upon People's Minds, by denying the Power of *Reaſon* and *Religion*, and aſcribing all human Actions to *Complexion, natural Temper*, &c.

It is an eaſy Thing to be a *Wit*, and a *Philoſopher*, if you will but write againſt Religion and Virtue; for I need not ſay all Arguments, but all Fancies, are admitted as Demonſtrations on that Side; and the bolder Steps you take, the ſurer you are of being eſteem'd a *Genius*.

Had Mr. *Bayle* fill'd his Books with the moſt uſeful, noble Truths, he had not had half ſo many Admirers, as for one ſingle Sentence, which the moſt thoughtleſs Rake might have ſaid through the mere Aſſurance of his own Extravagancies.

Speaking of *Fornication, I queſtion*, ſays he, *whether one Man in a Hundred is clear of the Guilt.*

Could he have ſaid a more extravagant Thing, that had reflected more upon Morality,

rality, and the Power of Religion, he had ſtill been more admired. It is thus that Mr. *Bayle* and *Eſprit* have purchaſed the Eſteem, and increaſed the Numbers of Infidels and Libertines.

Theſe Gentlemen are dead, and their Aſhes ſafe, if the Death of Men implies no more than the Fall of Leaves.

What Reaſons you have to appear in the ſame Cauſe of Immorality, or what Security you have againſt the Power of God, is, I dare ſay, not known to your ſelf.

Infidelity and Irreligion have few Topicks for Reflection, they have not ſo much as one Argument on their ſide.

You can no more ſhew that you are not immortal, than you can ſhew what was doing before the Creation of the World.

To fanſy that all expires with the Body, is as well ſupported, as if you was to fanſy that there are no Beings but what are viſible to your Eyes. To ſuppoſe that Man will never be called to an Account, is as much to be depended upon, as if you ſuppoſed that there will be nothing in Being a Thouſand Years hence.

Yet theſe are the *ſtrong Foundations* of Infidelity and Prophaneneſs, theſe are the *ſolid Principles* upon which great *Philoſophers* eſtabliſh, deluded, (or as they call themſelves) *Free-Thinkers*.

A Re-

A Revelation from God, that juſtifies it ſelf from the Creation of the World; that tells you every Truth that a wiſe Man would be glad to hear; that is ſupported with all the Authority that an omnipotent God can give; that is confirm'd with all the Aſſurance that human Teſtimony can afford, is of no Weight againſt a few bold Aſſertions of weak Mortals, who exceed their Fellow-Creatures only in Arrogance and Preſumption.

SECT. II.

ONE would imagine, by what has already paſs'd, that you had ſufficiently vented your Paſſion upon moral Virtue, and that you had hardly any more Arrows to draw againſt it; but you proceed to ſhew us, that however you may fail in Argument, you will never be wanting in Inclination to attack it.

You ſet your ſelf with an Air of Satisfaction, as if Morality and Religion lay at your Feet, *to examine into the* Pulchrum *and* Honeſtum *of the Antients*; that is, *to enquire whether there be any real Excellency or Worth in Things, a Pre-eminence of one Thing above another* *.

* p. cccl xxiii.

And to ſhew that there is no ſuch Thing as any real Worth or Excellency in Things or Actions, but that all is mere Whim and Fancy, you proceed thus:

In the Works of Nature, Worth and Excellency is as uncertain. How whimſical is the Floriſt! Sometimes the Tulip, *ſometimes the* Auricula, *ſhall engroſs his Eſteem. What Mortal can decide which is the handſomeſt Abſtract from the Mode in being, to wear great Buttons, or ſmall ones*?*

In Morals, ſay you, *there is no greater Certainty†.*

So that according to your Philoſophy, he who perfers Equity to Injuſtice, is but like him that chuſes a *great Button* rather than a *ſmall* one; and he who prefers Fidelity to Falſeneſs, as whimſical as the *Floriſt*, who admires the *Auricula* more than the *Tulip*.

Now if there be only this Difference between *Actions*, then there can be no greater Difference between *Agents*; the beſt of Men can only excel the vileſt of their Race, as a *Tulip* may excel an *Auricula*.

Nay, if Truth and Falſhood be no otherwiſe different from one another, than as one Button differs from another, then it muſt follow, that there can be no greater Difference between the Author of the one, and the Author of the other.

Now,

* p. cccIxxvii. † p. cccIxxix.

Now, the Religion of our Country tells us, that God is *Truth*, and the Devil the Author of *Lies*.

This, Sir, you see is the direct, immediate Blasphemy of your Notions, and not drawn from them by any distant or remote Consequences.

And if I should ask you why one should be worshipp'd rather than the other, I should puzzle your profound Philosophy, as much as if I ask'd you which was the finest Flower; for you cannot tell me that one of these Beings is really good, and the other really evil, and yet maintain, that there is no real Goodness in Truth, nor any real Evil in Lies and Falshood.

It is utterly impossible to answer this Question, without giving up your *Uncertainty in Morals*, and allowing that there is something certain and immutable in the Worth and Excellency of Things and Actions.

Should any one charge you with the grossest Villanies, and most flagrant Immoralities that ever were committed by Man, you could have no more Pretence to be angry at the Imputation, than if he had said, you was particularly fond of little Buttons.

To proceed: *Which is the best Religion.* say you, *is a Question that has caused more Mischief than all other Questions together**,

* p. cccl xxix.

Religion never comes in your way, but it puts you in a Paſſion; tho' I dare ſay, you never had any harm by it in your Life. This is a heavy Charge upon Religion, and upon the beſt Religion, for that is it which is enquired after. You charge a great deal of Miſchief to this Enquiry after the beſt Religion, on purpoſe to enhance, I ſuppoſe, your own Merit, that you may appear to do a more publick Good, who endeavour to deſtroy the very Idea of it.

But as miſchievous as you reckon this Enquiry to be, I am of another Opinion, taken from him who made the Enquiry neceſſary, who is God himſelf.

Thou ſhalt have no other God beſides me, was ſetting up the beſt Religion; and *thou ſhalt not make to thy ſelf any graven Image*, &c. was a Determination againſt *Paganiſm*. Now I look upon the beſt Religion to be a Matter of great Moment, becauſe God has commanded it; and take the Enquiry after it to be well authoriz'd, becauſe God has forbid all falſe Worſhip.

If you like it the worſe for having this Authority, and ſhould be better pleas'd with Religion, if it was ſome Politician's Invention, I ſhall only ſay, that you are fonder of Cheats than I am.

Again; I don't allow my ſelf to be angry at the Enquiry after the beſt Religion, becauſe I find that our bleſſed Saviour came

into

into the World to teach Men the beſt Religion, and with the higheſt Rewards and Puniſhments to purſuade Men to ſeek after and embrace it. *This is Life eternal, to know Thee, the only true God, and Jeſus Chriſt whom thou haſt ſent.* And again, *Go ye and teach all Nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the End of the World.*

This convinces me, that the Enquiry after the beſt Religion, is the nobleſt, the moſt happy and beneficial of all others, becauſe it is an Enquiry after eternal Happineſs: But ſince you take it to have done more Miſchief than all other Enquiries, you know now where to charge it, you know who it was that ſent Twelve Apoſtles, endu'd with reſiſtleſs Power, to perſuade all the Nations of the World to enquire after, and receive the one beſt Religion. *Ask it,* ſay you, (*i. e.* which is the beſt Religion) *at* Peking, *at* Conſtantinople, *at* Rome, *and you'll receive three diſtinct Anſwers, extremely different from one another, yet all of them equally poſitive and peremptory. Chriſtians are well aſſured of the Falſity of the Pagan and Mahometan Superſtitions; but enquire of the ſeveral Sects they are divided into, which is the true Church of Chriſt? And all of them will tell you it is theirs**.

Then

* p. cccIxxix.

Then comes your Golden Concluſion, *It is manifeſt, then, that the hunting after this* Pulcrum *and* Honeſtum, *is not much better than a Wild Gooſe Chaſe* &c.

Here I obſerve, that very conſiſtently indeed with your ſelf, having rejected all moral Virtue, and natural Religion, you treat Revelation in the ſame manner. Chriſtianity and Pagniſm are put upon the ſame foot, and the Enquiry, which is the beſt, eſteem'd no better than a *Wild-Gooſe-Chaſe*, &c. Is this Declaration of yours the Effect of a ſerious Enquiry into the Merits of different Religions? That cannot be, it reflects too much upon ſo fine an Underſtanding as yours, to ſuppoſe, that you could ever have been ſeriouſly *chaſing of wild Geeſe*.

The Acuteneſs of your Parts, muſt have always prevented the Enquiry. You knew, I ſuppoſe *ab origine*, from your Cradle, that there was no God, or you could not have been always ſo clear about the Inſignificancy of any Religion? for if there be a God; it is more than probable that he is to be worſhip'd, and it is hardly to be ſuppos'd that all Ways of Worſhip are equally acceptable to him.

You repreſent the Enquiry after the beſt Religion, as a mere *Wild-Gooſe-Chaſe*, becauſe, if the Queſtion is put at *Peking*, *Conſtantinople*, or amongſt the various Sects of Chri-

Christians, all of them claim the only true Worship.

Now, Sir, I'll remove the Question from the Disciples and Followers, to the *Authors* of these Religions. You shall put the Question thus, Ask *Jesus*, ask *Mahomet*, ask some *Pagan* Impostor, and you'll receive three distinct Answers, extremely different from one another, and yet equally positive and peremptory.

Will you stand to your Conclusion here, and therefore it is Madness to concern our selves more about the one than the other?

Is there any Creature so absurd, as to think this an Argument against *Christ*, or that the Enquiry after him is Folly, because there was one *Mahomet* call'd for Disciples?

Yet the Argument is full as just and cogent against Christ himself, as against the Religion which he has instituted; for if the Religion of *Christ* and that of *Mahomet* have nothing to distinguish them, and Christianity is to be ridicul'd and despis'd, because there is such a Religion as *Mahometism*, then it does undeniably follow, that Christ, when on Earth, might be justly rejected, because there have been other Persons who have pretended to come from God.

This Argument of yours, (if it proves any thing) proves it impossible that there ever should be any Revelation or Religion from God, which Mankind would be obliged

to

to receive, ſo long as there was either wicked Spirits or wicked Men in the World. For evil Spirits and evil Men will have evil Deſigns, and will oppoſe the Wiſdom and Providence of God, in ſetting up Ways of Religion ſuitable to their own Tempers and Deſigns. But according to your Argument, no Religion has any Pretence to our Regard, when once it is oppos'd; nor need we trouble our Heads about the Truth of any, becauſe there is more than one that lays Claim to it, which is as good Senſe, as if you was to affirm, that a *Lie* was a Demonſtration, that there was no ſuch thing as *Truth*.

Whereas the very Poſſibility of a falſe Religion implies the Poſſibility of a true one, as much as Falſhood implies the Poſſibility of Truth, or Wrong ſuppoſes Right.

The wiſeſt Speech therefore that you can make to your ſagacious Followers, is this:

" Gentlemen, I would not have you to " eat or drink, becauſe *Phyſicians* differ " very much about Diet, and Poiſons are " generally conveyed that way; nor would " I have you take any Money, becauſe there " is counterfeit Coin in the World.

" There are a great many falſe Accounts " of Things, therefore you need not, nay, " ought not to trouble your ſelves about " any that are true.

" You

" You may laugh at *David*, when he " says, *the Heavens declare the Glory of* " *God, and the Firmament sheweth his* " *handy-work*, because there is a contrary " Opinion, *a Fool that hath said in his* " *Heart there is no God.*

" You need not regard Christianity, or " its divine Institution, because there are " other Religions at *Peking* and *Constanti-* " *nople*; nor need you worship the true God, " because in *Egypt* they worshipped *Leeks* " and *Onions:* Nay, you need not hold " that there is any true God, because there " are People who have invented false Deities.

" When any History is urg'd upon you, " you may answer, that of *Robinson Crusoe*, " is call'd a *true* Account; or any one pre- " tends to be *positive* on the side of Vir- " tue, you may confute his Arrogance, by " saying, it can never be proved that the " *Auricula* exceeds the *Tulip.*

" These are strong and short Maxims, " which will support you against the Wis- " dom of all Ages; they confute whole " Volumes of *Prophets* and *Apostles* with " a Word speaking.

" These are Doctrines that require no " Study or Application, and you may be- " lieve them to be proper, by their Fitness " for use. You may drink, debauch, eat, " and sleep as you please, without hinder- " ing your Progress in these Doctrines,

" Luxury and Wantonneſs will improve
" your Readineſs, and your very Dulneſs
" will make you more acute.

" Nay, the more you ſink into Senſuality
" and the animal Life, the more you will
" feel and reliſh the Truth of theſe Senti-
" ments. Though you are to fly from all
" Appearance of Truth, and avoid all Con-
" cern about any Religion, as you would
" avoid the Folly of *chaſing of wild Geeſe*;
" yet you muſt remember, that you are
" my Scholars: For I am an *Abſtract-*
" *Thinker*, and in theſe my abſtract Specu-
" lations, you muſt be my diligent and du-
" tiful Scholars. Though Chriſtianity may
" be diſpis'd, becauſe other Religions are
" ſet up againſt it, yet you muſt value me
" the more for being contrary to the wiſeſt
" Men of all Ages in the World.

" Though there is nothing certain or
" valuable in religious Truths, though moral
" Virtue is the *Offspring* of Pride, the *In-*
" *vention* of Philoſophers, and all mere
" Whim and Fancy; yet my Speculations
" having the utmoſt Contrariety to all that
" is virtous, moral, or religious, you may
" ſafely put your whole Truſt and Confi-
" dence in them.

This is the beſt Speech that you can poſſibly make to your deluded Followers; and I dare ſay, if your Principles would allow of

of greater Stupidity or Dullneſs, you would not be without a Party, who, to avoid Salvation, would joyn with an Enemy to Virtue, merely for the Sake of his Cauſe.

The Infidelity of the preſent Age is very great, and ſhews ſuch a Contempt of ſacred Things, as was hardly ever heard of before.

If one enquires into the Grounds of it, it ſeems founded on ſuch an implicit Faith repoſed in Men of wanton and ſenſual Minds, as is look'd upon to be mean and ſlaviſh, when yielded to the higheſt Evidence in Matters of the laſt Moment.

To believe *Moſes* and the *Prophets*, is ridicul'd, becauſe it is *believing*; but to be a Slave to a wanton Infidel, and blindly ſwear into his Opinions, is glorious and manly, becauſe it is *Free-thinking*.

Deiſts and *Free-thinkers* are generally conſider'd as *Unbelievers*; but upon Examination, they will appear to be Men of the moſt reſign'd and implicit Faith in the World; they would believe *Tranſubſtantiation*; but that it implies a believing in God; for they never reſign their Reaſon, but when is is to yield to ſomething that oppoſes Salvation.

For the *Deiſts* Creed has as many Articles as the *Chriſtians*, and requires a much greater Suſpenſion of our Reaſon to believe them. So that if to believe Things upon

no Authority, or without any Reaſon, be an Argument of Credulity, the *Free-thinker* will appear to be the moſt eaſy, credulous Creature alive. In the firſt place, he is to believe almoſt all the ſame Articles to be falſe, which the Chriſtian believes to be true.

Now, it may eaſily be ſhewn, that it requires ſtronger Acts of Faith to believe theſe Articles to be falſe, than to believe them to be true.

For, taking Faith to be an Aſſent of the Mind to ſome Propoſition, of which we have no certain Knowledge, it will appear that the Deiſt's Faith is much ſtronger, and has more of Credulity in it than the Chriſtian's. For inſtance, the Chriſtian believes the *Reſurrection* of the Dead, becauſe he finds it ſupported by ſuch Evidence and Authority, as cannot poſſibly be higher, ſuppoſing the Thing was true; and he does no more Violence to his Reaſon in believing it, than in ſuppoſing that God may intend to do ſome Things, which the Reaſon of Man can't conceive how they will be effected.

On the contrary, the *Deiſt believes* there will be no Reſurrection. And how great is his Faith! for he pretends to no Evidence or Authority to ſupport it, it is a pure, naked Aſſent of his Mind to what he does not

not know to be true, and of which no Body has or can give him any full Assurance.

So that the Difference between a *Christian* and a *Deist* does not consist in this, that the one assents to Things unknown, and the other does not; but in this, that the Christian assents to Things unknown, on the account of Evidence; the other assents to Things unknown, without any Evidence at all.

Which shews, that the *Christian* is the rational Believer, and the *Deist* the blind Bigot.

Ask a *Deist* or a *Free-thinker* why he believes Christianity to be an Imposture, you must not expect to have any Arguments offer'd you; but however, all Arguments aside, he can tell you, that the Enquiry after the best Religion has done *more Mischief*, than all other Enquires together; that it is, at best, but *a Wild-Goose Chase*; he will tell you how *Jesus* has been call'd the *Galilean* by way of Contempt; that there are various Readings in the Scriptutes; that Mr. *Whiston* is the most learned and sincere Divine of the Age; that he has call'd the present Doctrine of the Trinity an *Apostasy*; and says, that the present Text of the *Old Testament*, is not that which was used in our Saviour's Time: He may, perhap, crack a Jest upon some Text of the New Testament, and tell you how such a one used to say,

ſay, that *working a Miracle, was like ſhewing a Trick.*

If you have Strength enough to maintain your Ground againſt ſuch Attacks as theſe, the *Deiſts* can get no Power over you: But it muſt be confeſs'd, that idle and fooliſh as theſe Arts appear in Point of Reaſon, yet they are very fatal in their Effects upon the Minds of Men.

Religion requires a ſerious and wiſe Uſe of our Reaſon, and can only recommend it ſelf to us, when we are in a Diſpoſition to reaſon and think ſoberly; it preſerves its Power over our Minds no longer, than whilſt we conſider it as the moſt ſerious, important, and ſacred Thing in the World.

Hence it appears, why we are generally to ſo little affected with Religion, becauſe we are ſeldom in a State of ſober thinking. The Concerns of the World keep our Spirits in a conſtant Hurry, and prevent our judging rightly of thoſe things, which are not to be judg'd of, but by cool Reaſon.

Every one knows, that Sickneſs, Adverſity, and the approach of Death, are advantagious Seaſons for the Truths of Religion to affect us; whereas they carry no other Advantage, than as they bring a Man into ſuch a State, as diſpoſes him to think ſeriouſly. For this Reaſon, they who only *laugh* at Religion, may be ſaid to have us'd the ſtrongeſt Argument againſt it, for there

is

is no coming at it any other way; it is only to be attack'd by little Jeſts, lewd flings of Wit, ſuch as may betray the Mind into Levity, and corrupt the Imagination, which ſo far as it is effected, ſo far is the power of Religion leſſen'd.

It is not the Deiſts buſineſs to reaſon ſoberly, and conſider the Weight and Moment of things with exactneſs; for to reaſon ſoberly, is to act againſt himſelf, and put his Reader into that State of Mind in which Religion has its chief Force.

But idle Stories about Gods and Godeſſes, and Pagan Myſteries, ſawcy Jeſts, lewd Innuendo's, and nick-names given to ſerious Things, ſerve the Cauſe of Infidelity, much better, than any Arguments, it has yet found out.

For theſe ſerve not only to confound and diſtract the Mind, and leſſen the difference of things, but they alſo gratify and engage the moſt immoral and wicked Men, as they furniſh them with a Confutation of Religion at ſo cheap a Rate,

How many fine Gentlemen muſt have been forc'd to have own'd themſelves Chriſtians, had not ſuch ſhort Confutations of Chriſtianity been provided to their Hands! But as the Cauſe is now manag'd, no one can be too dull, ſenſeleſs or debauch'd, to be a powerful Deiſt; a poor inflam'd Wretch, who never had the uſe of his Reaſon in his Life,

Life, may eaſily call Religion a *Dulcinea del toboſa*, and all who would procure any regard to it, *Saint errants*, and when he has done this, he may reckon himſelf a *great Genius*, and to have ſhewn as much Learning in favour of Deiſm, as the firſt Rate Infidel of the Age.

How many lively *Beaux* had buried their Parts in ſwearing and Obſcenity, had not all Jeſts upon Scripture been allow'd, as true Proofs of *Deiſm* and Politeneſs!

And tho' the *Fraternity* now boaſts of its Numbers (as every Vice if it could ſpeak might do the ſame) yet, if no one was to be allow'd to be a *Deiſt*, till he had examin'd the Truths and Authory of Religion, as he would examine the *Title* to an Eſtate, even the preſent Age, would be able to ſhew more *Squarers* of the Circle, or *Diſcoverers* of the Longitude, than *Profeſſors* of Deiſm.

Nay, was one to ask the moſt philoſophical amongſt them, to ſhew the *great Danger* of being a good Chriſtian, or the fatal Conſequences of living in expectation of the *Reſurrection*, and *Judgment* to come; was he ask'd to ſhew the certain ſafety of *Infidelity*, or why an Infidel can be no Sufferer for rejecting the offers of the Goſpel, he could give you as plain an Anſwer, as if you had ask'd what State this *Globe* of Earth will be in, five thouſand Years hence.

But

But indeed it ſeems needleſs to obſerve that Prudence or common Senſe, have no Hand in Infidelity. Self-murther does not more directly prove Lunacy, than Infidelity proves the loſs of Reaſon.

There is no one that ſeems more to depend upon the Folly and Madneſs of his Readers, than you do.

You tell them that you are a *mere Animal* govern'd by Appetites over which you have no Power; that is, you deſcribe your ſelf as a *Machine* that would look well in a *Bridle*, and then pretend to talk of God, and Providence, and Religion, and Morality, and to pierce into the inmoſt nature of Things and Actions, with as much Eaſe, as if you was ſome ſuperior Form, that was made up of pure Wiſdom and Intelligence.

But the thing is, you knew what ſide you had choſen, and that if you was not wanting in Impiety, Lewdneſs, and Reproaches upon Virtue, you might abound in Nonſenſe as much as you pleas'd.

And indeed it muſt be confeſs'd, that as hardly any Authority is ſufficient to recommend a Perſon, that comes from God, to do us good, ſo is there ſcarce any Folly great enough to expoſe another, that comes a Miſſioner from the Kingdom of Darkneſs to do us Harm.

SECT. IV.

YOU are at last so sensible of the Abilities, which you have discover'd, in laying open the Mysteries of human Nature, that you think it but a necessary piece of Civility, to make an Apology to the World, for shewing such a superior Knowledge. Thus say you,

What Hurt do I do to Man, if I make him more known to himself than he was before?

But we are so desperately in Love with Flattery, that we can never relish a Truth that is mortifying.

To prove the Justice of this Remark, you say, *I don't believe the Immortality of the Soul would even have found so general a Reception in human Capacities as it has, had it not been a pleasing one, that extoll'd and was a Compliment to the whole Species*.*

This Remark supposes that the *Mortality* of the Soul is a *Truth*, for you make our not believing it to be Mortal, a Proof that we can't relish a Truth that is mortifying. You also impute our Opinion of the Souls Immortality, to a *desperate love of*

---

* P. ccivi.

of Flattery, which is giving it as ſure a Mark of an Error, as you could well have thought of.

The reaſonableneſs of this Remark, is founded upon that Advantage and Dignity, which ariſes from Immortality; this is it which induces you to think that its Reception in human Capacities is owing to a love of Flattery.

You might have made the ſame Remark upon the *Belief* of the *Being* and Providence of God, that they had never had ſo general a Reception in human Capacities, were not Men deſperately *in love with Flattery, and not able to reliſh a Truth that is mortifying*.

For the *Being* and *Providence* of God, are the moſt pleaſing *Truths*, and more extol and elevate Mans Nature and Condition than any thing elſe, and whilſt we aſſert the Providence of God, we aſſert our own Happineſs, as being the Care and Concern of ſo great and glorious a Nature.

But how ought that Man to be treated, who ſhould bring the *Belief* of a Divine Being as an Inſtance of the Power of Flattery over human Nature, or alledge the Doctrine of Providence as a Proof, that we can't reliſh a Truth that is mortifying.

Yet this would be as well, as to inſtance as you have done in the Immortality of the Soul. For it is as reaſonable to rejoice

in the Immortality of our Souls, as in the Being of God; and it is as impious to ſay, that we hold its Immortality, becauſe we cannot reliſh a Truth that is mortifying; as to ſay that we believe the Providence of God for the ſame Reaſon.

What an Averſion muſt you have to the Force of this Principle, that when you was to ſhew, that we can't reliſh a *Truth* that is mortifying, you could like no Inſtance ſo well, as the general disbelief of the Souls Mortality? Can it be ſuppos'd that you would have inſtanc'd in this Opinion, if you had not wiſh'd, that it ſhould loſe its Force upon Mens Minds, be no longer conſider'd as the corner Stone of Religion, but as a *Notion* founded in the Falſeneſs, Pride and Flattery of Man's Nature?

Was any one ever ſo angry at the *Macedonian* Hero's Vanity of being a God; need he have reproach'd him more, than by imputing it to a *deſperate love of Flattery.*

Yet this is the tender Method, in which you have choſe to expoſe the Belief of the Souls Immortality, as owing to a deſperate love of Flattery.

You will perhaps ſay, *Have I deny'd the Souls Immortality?*

In expreſs Terms you have not deny'd it; ſuch a flat denial would have ſignify'd much leſs, than what you have ſaid.

You

You knew very well, that to impute the Belief of it to Falſeneſs and Flattery, was the beſt way of denying it.

It is rejected here in a manner that highly ſuits the Temper of Irreligion, by being conſider'd not only as falſe, but as ariſing from the baſeſt Qualities of Human Nature, *Pride* and a *deſperate* Love of *Flattery*.

Theſe Things ſerve not only to raiſe a Disbelief, but to excite an Indignation againſt a Principle owing to ſuch reproachful Cauſes; and what is ſtill a greater Point gain'd, they teach People to look with Contempt and Diſlike on thoſe Perſons, and that Religion which teaches ſuch a Principle.

Our bleſſed Saviour ſaith, *I am the Reſurrection and the Life, he that believeth in me ſhall never die.*

Now, according to your Philoſophy, this Speech of our Saviour's, muſt be reckon'd an artful Application to the Weakneſs and Vanity of Human Nature, an Addreſs to the blind Side of Man, to increaſe his Love of Flattery, and keep him from a true Knowledge of himſelf.

For if Man believes the Immortality of his Soul, through a deſperate Love of Flattery, certainly he who comes to encourage and eſtabliſh ſuch a Belief, comes to encourage and eſtabliſh that immoderate Love of Flattery.

Nay,

Nay, this Doctrine of yours, not only ſerves to expoſe the Opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, and reproaches the Chriſtian Religion which teaches it; but it prepares a Man to be Proof againſt all Doctrines of Religion that have any Happineſs in them; for whatever is believ'd or practis'd that tends any way to raiſe or exalt the Condition of Man, is equally ſubject to this Reproach, that it is *receiv'd* through an exceſſive Fondneſs of Flattery.

So that your wiſe Philoſophy comes to this, that if there was no Honour or Happineſs in Religion, was there no Greatneſs to be acquir'd by our obeying God, it could not be charg'd upon our Pride and Vanity; but ſince Religion is in order to Happineſs, and ſince our worſhipping of God, implies our having a great and glorious Friend and Benefactor, ſuch a Religion may be owing to a Vice of our Nature, a *deſperate Love* of *Flattery*.

And the ſame may be ſaid of every virtuous Action, that it is practis'd through a deſperate Love of Flattery, in as much as Virtue is ſuppos'd to make us Friends and Favourites of God, and ſo dignifies and exalts our State.

Nay, this way of arguing proves, that the greater and more glorious the Idea is, which we form of God, the more we may be influenc'd by an ill Motive; for the greater

greater and more glorious we repreſent the Nature of God, the more we raiſe and dignify our ſelves, who are related to ſo great a Being, and are in Covenant with him.

So that to clear our ſelves of a deſperate Love of Flattery, and to ſhew that we can reliſh Truths that are mortifying, we ſhould conceive very low and mean Notions of God, and ſuch as made it neither our Honour nor Happineſs to worſhip him,

Such a Religion as this, that had nothing in it worthy of God or Men, might, according to your Account, be owing to ſome rational Principle, and not imputable to the Pride or Vanity of Mans Nature.

For ſince you impute the Belief of the Soul's Immortality, to a deſperate Love of Flattery, becauſe ſuch Belief ſet us out to great Advantage, and adds Dignity to our Nature.

The ſame Imputation is equally chargeable upon every Doctrine, or Practice, that promiſes any Happineſs or Honour to us; and no Religion or Opinions can be free from that Charge, but ſuch as are of no Benefit or Advantage to us.

From this therefore we may believe, that had we a Religion which propoſed nothing worthy of God, or beneficial to Man, the *Deiſts* and Wits of your Size, would all of them turn *Prieſts*, and devoutly wait at its *Altars*.

To ſpeak now a Word or two concerning *Pride.*

Pride is an Error or a Vice; as *Covetouſneſs* is a Vice, it is a noble Deſire, ill directed: It is a right Deſire, earneſtly to deſire Happineſs; but that Deſire is ſinful, when it is wholly ſet upon *Gold,* or any other *falſe* Good.

So a Deſire of Greatneſs is an excellent Deſire, a right Turn of Mind; but when it fixes upon a falſe Honour, it is a vitious Irregularity. To deſire the higheſt Exaltation of which our Nature is capable, is as right a Diſpoſition, as to deſire to be as like to God as we can.

Now, had you ſaid that the Belief of the Soul's Immortality, was aſſiſted and ſtrengthned in us, through a Deſire of Greatneſs, you had ſaid as reaſonable a Thing, as to ſay, that Chriſtianity makes a ſtronger Impreſſion upon the Minds of Men, through a Deſire of Happineſs.

For had we not theſe Diſpoſitions, neither Religion, nor any thing elſe that was of any Advantage to us, could take any hold of us: For, what would the Happineſs or Greatneſs of any Propoſal ſignify to Beings, whoſe Natures were not affected with them?

Now, to ſay that Religion is better received through this Tendency of our Nature, is no more a Reproach, than it is to

ſay

ſay that our Underſtanding and Reaſon recommend Religion to us.

For theſe Diſpoſitions or Inclinations conſtitute the Excellence of our Nature, and give us all the Dignity that we have.

It being as right a Judgment of the Mind, to deſire to be as like to God as our Natures will allow, as it is to prefer Truth to Falſhood.

But to impute our Belief of the Immortality of the Soul to *Pride*, is as ridiculous, as to impute our Deſire of eternal Happineſs to *Avarice*.

For *Pride*, conſider'd as a Vice, is no more the Cauſe of our Approbation of Immortality, than *Avarice* is the Cauſe of our ſetting our Affection on Things above.

Pride is as earthly and down-looking a Vice as Covetouſneſs, and as truly ſinks the Soul into a State of Meanneſs.

A Delight in falſe Honour as much debaſes and hinders the Mind from aſpiring after its true Greatneſs, as a Fondneſs for empty Riches keeps the Soul averſe from the Approbation of her true Good. That this is the Effect of Pride, that it debaſes the Mind, and makes it unable to reliſh its true Greatneſs, that it unfits it for the Reception of Doctrines which exalt and raiſe our Nature, may be alſo learnt from Him, who came to lead us unto all Truth.

Speaking of vain-glorious Men, ſays our bleſſed Saviour, *how can ye believe, which receive Honour one of another, and ſeek not that Honour, which cometh from God alone**.

But you make the Pride of Man, the Cauſe of his believing divine Truths; tho' they are as oppoſite to one another, as Avarice and Heavenly-mindedneſs, Light and Darkneſs.

To make ſome Apology for your ſelf, you ſay, *What Hurt do I do to a Man, if I make him more known to himſelf than he was before?*

You ſhould have put the Queſtion thus: What Hurt do I do to a Man, if I make him more vicious than he was before, if I deprave his Underſtanding, and lead him into a Contempt and Diſlike of the ſtrongeſt Principles of Religion?

For if there is any Danger either to your ſelf or others, in corrupting their Minds, and deſtroying the Motives to Religion and Virtue, you are capable of no other Apology, but what that Being may make, *who goeth about as a roaring Lion, ſeeking whom he may devour.*

The *Arrow that flieth by Day*, and the *Peſtilence that walketh in Darkneſs*, are mere Bleſſings, if compar'd to the Man who infuſes

* *St.* John v. 44.

infuſes vicious Opinions into the Mind, which weakens the Power of Religion, and makes Men leſs devoted to the Worſhip and Service of God,

How can you ſay, that you have only made Man more known to himſelf, by teaching him that the general Belief of the Soul's Immortality is owing to a deſperate Love of Flattery?

Have you proved, that he does not know himſelf if he thinks it is owing to any other Cauſe? Have you ſo much as attempted to ſhew, that it can have no other Foundation? That it is not founded in Reaſon, Religion, and the Attributes of God.

But proving (I recollect) is no Talent of yours; and if you may be allowed to *ſhine* in any thing, it is in looſe Inſinuations, poſitive Aſſertions, and vain Conjectures.

SECT. V.

YOU come now to give us a Taſte of your Skill in *Phraſeology*, or the Force and Propriety of Words. All ſorts of Learning ſeem to be at your Service, and you are ſo conſtant to your ſelf, as to make them all conſpire in one and the ſame Deſign againſt Religion,

Hope, being a Word of great Conſolation in the Chriſtian Religion, you have pitch'd upon that, as moſt deſerving the kind Aſſiſtance of your learned Hand.

All Hope, ſay you, *includes Doubt; a ſilver Inkhorn may paſs in Speech, becauſe every Body knows what we mean by it, but a certain Hope cannot. The Epithet deſtroys the Eſſence of the Subſtantive; it is palpable Nonſenſe. The Reaſon therefore why it is not ſo ſhocking to ſome, to hear a Man ſpeak of* certain Hope, *as if he ſhould talk of* hot Ice, *or* liquid Oak, *is not becauſe there is leſs Nonſenſe contain'd in the firſt*, than in either of the *latter*, *but becauſe the Word* Hope, I mean the *Eſſence* of *it*, *is not ſo clearly underſtood by the Generality of the People, as the Words and Eſſences of* Ice *and* Oak *are* *.

What a Triumph is here over Religion! And with how much Eaſe do you reject an Article of Faith with a *Noun Subſtantive!*

In our *Burial* Service we have theſe Words, *In ſure and certain Hope of a Reſurrection*, &c.

This it ſeems cannot paſs in Speech, without the Deſtruction of a *Subſtantive; it is ſhocking, and palpable Nonſenſe.*

Let

---

* p. cxlix.

Let it first be observ'd, that *Hope* implies the *Belief*, *Expectation*, or *Dependance* of something that shall come to pass. Now I should think that a Thing may as well be expected with Certainty, as Uncertainty; and that its being certain to happen, is no Inconsistency in the Expression, It can hardly be denied, but that a Man may be certain that some Things will never happen; and where is the Contradiction of supposing him as certain that some Things will happen?

But to come to your own Arguments.

All Hope, say you, *includes Doubt*. This as much contradicts my Understanding, as if you had said, that *all Trust* includes *Diffidence*; and that I can't trust a Man, unless I distrust him. The Apostle says, *by Hope we are sav'd*; according to you, he must mean, by *Doubting* we are sav'd; for if *Hope* necessarily includes *Doubting*, and *Hope* be necessary to Salvation, it evidently follows, that *Doubting* is necessary to Salvation; and every Exhortation to *hope* in God, is an Exhortation to *doubt* of God.

Our blessed Saviour said, *if ye have Faith, and doubt not*, &c. Now had you been present at this Saying, you could have shewn the Impossibility of what he exhorted them to; that *Faith* or *Hope* implied *Doubting*; and that to talk of *certain Hope* or *Faith*, was as shocking to a fine Understanding, as to talk of *hot Ice*, or *liquid Oak*.

Certain

Certain Hope, you ſay, is *palpable Nonſenſe*, becauſe the *Epithet* deſtroys the Eſſence of the *Subſtantive*.

So that *Doubting* is the Eſſence of *Hope*, and conſequently whatever elſe belongs to Hope, is only *accidental*; the Eſſence of Hope is Doubting.

Now if Doubting is the Eſſence of Hope, then where there is the moſt Doubting there muſt be the moſt of Hope, for where there is moſt of the Eſſence of a thing, there muſt neceſſarily be moſt of the thing it ſelf.

Now it ſeems to me as ridiculous, to make *Doubting* the Eſſence of *Hope*, as to make *Fear*, the Eſſence of *Courage*. For Hope ſo far as it goes, as much excludes Doubting, as Courage ſo far as it extends, baniſhes Fear. There may be a weak Hope which is mix'd with Doubt, as there may be a half Courage that is attended with Fear, but a thorough Hope as truly rejects Doubt, as a perfect Courage ſhakes off all Fear. And it is juſt ſuch *ſhocking Nonſenſe* to talk of a *certain Hope*, as to ſpeak of a *fearleſs Courage*: And there is juſt ſo much Murder of the *Subſtantive* in one Caſe, as the other.

Hope or Expectation does not imply *Incertainty*, but *Futurity*, that the things expected, are not in being, but are to come to paſs; this is all that is of the Eſſence of Hope;

Hope; it is only the *Futurity* of things that makes it.

Let the things come to paſs, and the Hope ceaſes, this is the only way of deſtroying it. But whether the things to come be with Certainty or Uncertainty expected, no more deſtroys that Diſpoſition of Mind, which is call'd Hope, than the Paſſion of *Fear* is deſtroy'd, by exerting it ſelf reaſonably or unreaſonably.

Hope is uncertain, not becauſe we cannot hope or expect with Certainty, but becauſe the things we hope for, are generally not in our Power, ſo as we can be ſecure of the Event.

But you ridiculouſly ſuppoſe, that Hope, or Expectation, as a Faculty of the Mind neceſſarily includes Incertainty, as if a Man cannot expect or hope for that, which he is ſure will anſwer his Expectation; or that he muſt ceaſe to expect things, becauſe he has certain grounds to expect them. Theſe are the Abſurdities which you plunge into, rather than allow a *certain Hope* of the *Reſurrection* of the Dead.

Hope is as the things hop'd for; in uncertain things it is uncertain. But if God is pleas'd to inform us of things to come, we are with *certain Hope* and Expectation to depend upon them.

Agreable

Agreable to this, St. *Paul* ſays, *In hope of eternal Life, which God, that cannot lye, promiſed before the World began.*

Here we have an Apoſtle's Authority for a *certain Hope*, made as undeniable as the Veracity of God.

But this muſt be very ſhocking to a Gentleman of your refin'd Underſtanding; and muſt give you a farther uneaſineſs to behold the Deſtruction of a whole Noun *Subſtantive*, to eſtabliſh only an Article of Religion.

You compare *certain Hope*, to *hot Ice*, or *liquid Oak*, and ſay that the Expreſſions would be equally *ſhocking*, were the Nature of *Hope* as well underſtood, as the Nature of *Ice* and *Oak*.

Had you not been us'd to underſtand every thing wrong, you had never made this Obſervation; for the contrary to this, happens to be true, that the Expreſſion is not ſo ſhocking in one Caſe as the other, becauſe the Nature of Hope is as well underſtood, as that of *Ice*, &c.

It is not ſhocking to ſay *certain Hope*, becauſe, Hope is known to be founded upon ſome degrees of Aſſurance.

But does *Ice* ſuppoſe ſome degrees of Heat in order to its Exiſtence? Is *Ice* hotter or Colder, as Hope is more or leſs aſſur'd? Hope is ſtronger and better, the *more* it has of Aſſurance, and the *leſs* it is oppos'd

pos'd with Doubts; but is *Ice* the ſtronger and harder, the *more* it has of Heat, or the *leſs* it is ſurrounded with Cold?

Your Compariſon alſo of *certain Hope*, to *liquid Oak*, is equally ingenious and worthy of your ſelf; for it ſuppoſes that an *Oak* changes from *ſolid* to *liquid*, as *Hope* fluctuates from *Doubts* to *Belief*. For were not an *Oak* as various in its Nature, as to *liquid* and *ſolid*, as *Hope* is various in its Nature, as to *Doubt* and *Aſſurance*, it muſt be *ſhocking* Nonſenſe, to make a *liquid Oak* the ſame thing as an *aſſur'd Hope*.

I have been the longer upon this Point, becauſe it is levell'd at the very Foundation of our Religion, and would teach People to doubt of its greateſt Articles, through the mere force of a Word or two, and for the ſake of a Noun *Subſtantive*.

SECT. VI.

I HAD now taken my Leave of you, if the Letter you publiſh'd in the *London Journal*, in defence of your Book, had not been juſt put into my Hands.

Having ſeen your Talent at Apology, I expected no great Matter from you in that Way; but however I am now convinc'd,

that your Book gives us but a ſmall Eſſay of your Abilities, and that you can exceed it as much as you pleaſe.

For who would imagine that the Author of ſo poor a Rhapſody, could produce ſuch maſterly Strokes as theſe in the Defence of it.

My Vanity, ſay you, *I never could conquer, ſo well as I could wiſh, and I am too proud to commit Crimes.*

Surely no one after this will venture to lay any thing to your Charge, ſince great muſt be your innocence, if Pride be the Guardian of it.

But if any one ſhould chance to humble you, you muſt then fall into a defenſeleſs State. But if you are not to be prov'd guilty, till you can be ſhewn to be deficient in Pride, it may require ſome time to effect it.

Since you ground your Vindication ſo much upon your Pride, it may not be amiſs to recollect the Definition you have given us of it in your own Book. *Pride*, ſay you, *is that natural Faculty, by which every Mortal, that has any Underſtanding, overvalues and imagines better things of himſelf, than any impartial Judge thoroughly acquainted with all his Qualities* and *Circumſtances would allow him**.

A pretty

---

* p. cxxv.

A pretty Qualification indeed, for a Man to found his Innocence upon! Yet, you (with a more than ordinary Brightneſs) own that you are govern'd by this *Vice*, to prove your ſelf to be *Faultleſs*,

Should a *blind* Man who had loſt his Way, alledge his *Blindneſs*, as a Proof that he could not loſe it, he would ſhew that he was juſt as well acquainted with the Advantages of Blindneſs, as you are with the Effects of Pride.

The next ingenious Step that you take is this: *The Fable of the Bees*, ſay you, *was deſign'd for the Entertainment of People of Knowledge and Education*, —— it is a *Book of ſevere and exalted Morality, that contains a ſtrict Teſt of Virtue.*

Had you ſaid that the Author was a *Seraphim*, and that he never was any nearer the Earth than the fix'd Stars, I ſhould have thought you in as ſober a Way as you now appear to be in.

That you intended it for the Entertainment of *People of Knowledge and Education*, is what I can't ſay is falſe, for, if your Pride is ſuch as you aſſert, you may be capable of intending any thing; I know of nothing too monſtrous for you to go about.

But if you can believe, that you have writ a Book of *ſevere and exalted Morality*, you muſt not laugh at thoſe who believe *Stocks*, and *Stones* to be Objects of Wor-

ſhip, or took a *Leek* or an *Onion* to be a *Deity*.

You are happy in this, that you have made an Aſſertion which an Adverſary cannot farther expoſe, becauſe there is no ſuperior Degree of Extravagance to which it can be compar'd.

For if a Perſon will write a Book to prove that Man is a *mere Animal* and that *moral Virtue* is the political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride, and then call it a Book of *ſevere* and *exalted Morality*, he has this Satisfaction, that no Skill can aggravate his Nonſenſe.

Such as it is, you ſay, *you are ſatisfy'd it has diverted Perſons of great Probity and Virtue.*

Pray, Sir, how does this appear? Where do you find theſe People of *great Virtue?* When you writ your Book, you knew of no ſuch People. Virtue was then no where to be found: For you tell us, that having in vain ſought for it in the World, you at laſt went to the *Convents*, but even there it had no Exiſtence. But now, it ſeems, rather than want an Apology, you'll ſuppoſe even what confutes your Book, and what you moſt hate, that there is ſuch a Being as a Man of *great Virtue*.

I lay it down, you add, *as a firſt Principle, that in all Societies, great or ſmall, it is the Duty of every Member of it to be good;*

good; that Virtue ought to be encourag'd, Vice diſcountenanc'd, the Laws obey'd, and the Tranſgreſſors puniſh'd; and then, you ſay, there is not *a Line in the whole Book that contradicts this Doctrine.*

This comes ſo oddly from you, that it need not be expos'd to the Reader; if you had intended it as a *publick Recantation* of all that you had deliver'd before, there had been ſomething in it; but to ſay, that *there is not a Line in your Book that contradicts this,* is truſting too much to the Weakneſs of your Readers: For, can you pretend to have a *firſt Principle,* or to talk of *Duty* or *Virtue,* after you have declar'd, that the *moral Virtues* are all a Cheat, by making them the *political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride?*

Can you recommend *Goodneſs,* who have compar'd the *Pulchrum* and *Honeſtum* in Actions, to the whimſical Diſtinctions of *Flowers,* and made the Difference between Good and Evil as fanciful, as the Difference between a *Tulip* and an *Auricula.*

When therefore you pretend to *lay it down as a firſt Principle, that it is the Duty of every Man to be good,* &c.

It amounts to as much as if you had ſaid, having ſhewn, that there is nothing but Fancy in the Preference of Flowers, *I lay it down as a firſt Principle, that it is the Duty of every Man to admire the* Tulip

above

above all other Flowers; that the Love of Tulips *ought to be encourag'd; and that of* Auricula's *diſcountenanc'd*, &c.

But however, leſt any of your Readers ſhould imagine that you meant ſomething more than this, and to clear your ſelf from all Suſpicion of Gravity or Serioufneſs, in your Recommendation of *Virtue* and *Goodneſs*, you immediately add this Explication of your ſelf.

Would you baniſh Fraud and Luxury, prevent Prophaneneſs and Irreligion, and make the Generality of the People charitable, good, and virtuous; break down the Printing-Preſſes, melt the Founds, and burn all the Books in the Iſland; knock down Foreign Trade, prohibit all Commerce with Strangers, and permit no Ships to go to Sea; reſtore to the Clergy, the King, and the Barons, their antient Privileges, Prerogatives, and Poſſeſſions; build new Churches, and convert all the Coin you can come at, into ſacred Utenſils; erect Monaſteries and Alms-houſes in Abundance, and let no Pariſh be without a Charity-School; let the Clergy preach Abſtinence and Self-denial to others, and take what Liberty they pleaſe for themſelves; let no Man be made Lord-Treaſurer but a Biſhop.--- By ſuch pious Endeavours, and wholeſome Regulations, the Scene would ſoon be alter'd.---Such a Change would influence the Manners of the Nation, and ren-

der

der them temperate, honeſt, and ſincere, and from the next Generation we might reaſonably expect an harmleſs, innocent, and well meaning People, that would never diſpute the Doctrine of Paſſive-Obedience, nor any other Othodox Principles, but be ſubmiſſive to Superiors, and unanimous in Religious Worſhip *.

It muſt be own'd, that you never ſo much exceeded yourſelf as in this Flight of your Oratory. And had your teeming Imagination been able to have produc'd one more Evil or Folly, it had been added to the lovely Idea you have form'd of a People intending to live like Chriſtians.

He that can now ſuſpect you guilty of one ſober Thought in relation to Religion or Morality, muſt be acknowledg'd to be very ſenſeleſs.

For, mention your Regard to Religion or Virtue as often as you pleaſe, you have here taken care to aſſure us, that you wiſh their Proſperity as *heartily* as you wiſh to ſee the Kingdom full of *Monaſteries*, and all our Money *converted* into *ſacred Utenſils*.

But I beg pardon for ſuppoſing, that what you have ſo clearly ſaid, to ſhew your Abhorrence of Religion and Contempt of Virtue, needs any illuſtration.

But

---

* p. cclix

But to carry on the *Banter* you ſtill add, *If I have ſhewn the Way to worldly Greatneſs, I have always without Heſitation prefer'd the Road that leads to Virtue.*

Had there been one Inſtance of this kind in your Book, I ſuppoſe you would have referr'd us to it. But enough has been already obſerv'd, to ſhew what Virtue implies in your Syſtem. I ſhall however produce one Paſſage to ſhew, how you *always and without Heſitation prefer the Road that leads to Virtue.*

Speaking of *Luſt* you ſay, the *artful Moraliſts have taught us chearfully to ſubdue it.* And then you cry out, *Oh! the mighty Prize we have in view for all our* Self-denial! *Can any Man be ſo ſerious as to abſtain from Laughter, when he conſiders that for ſo much Deceit and Inſincerity practis'd upon ourſelves as well as others, we have no other Recompence, then the vain Satisfaction of making our Species appear more exalted, and remote from that of other Animals than it really is, and we in our own Conſciences know it to be* *.

Thus it is, that *without Heſitation* you give your Approbation of Virtue; you make the Moderation of our Paſſions to be even a Sin againſt our *own Conſciences,* as acting *deceit-*

* p. cliii.

deceitfully contrary to what we know becomes us.

You make *Self-denial*, or any Reſtraints which diſtinguiſh us from Brutes, to be ſo ridiculous a Thing, as ought to excite the Laughter and Contempt of every Creature.

Thus is your proſtitute Pen wantonly employed, to put out as far as you can, the Light of Reaſon and Religion, and deliver up mankind to Senſuality and Vileneſs.

Should I now lament the miſerable Fruits of *Free-thinking*, which thus tend not only to ſet us looſe from the Regards of Religion, but to deſtroy whatever is reaſonable, decent, or comely in human Nature; tho' as a Friend of Religion I might be cenſur'd by *ſome*, yet ſurely as an advocate for the Dignity of Man, I might be pardon'd by *all*.

But it is our peculiar Unhappineſs as Clergymen, that if we ſit looſe to the Duties of Religion, we are doubly reproach'd, and if we firmly aſſert its Doctrines, we fall under as great Condemnation.

In all other Cauſes a Man is better receiv'd, becauſe it is his proper Buſineſs to appear, yet that which ſhould recommend our Pleadings, happens to make them leſs regarded: We are worſe heard, becauſe God has made it our Duty to ſpeak.

But I wave this Topick; for, if when we aſſert the common Doctrines of Chriſtianity,

we are thought too much intereſted, we ſhall hardly be reckon'd leſs ſelfiſh; when we plead for common Equity towards our ſelves.

You have therefore pick'd out a right Body of Men to ridicule; and your manner of doing it, ſhews, you knew, that no want of Wit would make you leſs ſucceſsful.

We often ſuffer from *Porters* and *Carmen*, who venture to be ſmart upon us, thro' an Aſſurance, that we muſt loſe by replying. A Security like this has encourag'd you to be very liberal of your Mirth, and ſuch Mirth as might paſs for *Dulneſs* upon any other Subject.

I won't ſay how infinite your Wit has been upon our Dreſs and Habit, or what uncommon *Vivacity* you have ſhewn upon the *Beaver* Hat, whether new or old.

Had you ſpar'd our *Majeſtick Gate, ſlick Faces kept conſtantly ſhav'd, handſome Nails diligently par'd, and Linen tranſparently curious* *, nothing of the *Sublime* had been found in your Book. It muſt be confeſs'd this is an heavy Charge againſt the *Prieſthood*, but we may ſee you was loath to enhance it, or you might have mention'd the *black Eyes* the *high Foreheads*, and the *dimpled*

* p. cxxxvii.

led Chins, which may be prov'd upon ſeveral of them, which they ſhew in the Face of the World at Noon-Day.

But ſince I have charg'd you with *Wit*, I don't think it fair to leave you under ſo groſs an Accuſation, without ſomething to ſupport your Spirits. Read therefore the following Words of the moſt excellent *Bruyere:*

Have the Libertines, ſays he, *who value themſelves ſo much upon the Title of* Wits, *have they* Wit *enough to perceive that they are only call'd ſo by Irony?*

You can hardly reliſh any thing of mine, after this taſte of ſo fine a Writer, I ſhall therefore trouble you but little farther.

If you wonder, that I have taken no Notice of the dreadful Evils you charge upon *Charity-Schools*, and the ſad Effects which ſuch *catechizing Houſes* muſt have upon a Kingdom that is both *Chriſtian* and *Proteſtant*; I muſt tell you that I purpoſely avoided it. Some Things are ſo plain, that it is yeilding too much, to offer to defend them.

Chriſtians, I hope, will have ſo much common Senſe as to know, that no Chriſtian can call ſuch Houſes an evil; and as to Complaints from other hands, who would not wiſh that the Enemies of Chriſtianity may have every Day more reaſon to complain.

As to your Part they will obſerve, that in theſe very Writings, where you complain of the Evil of *Charity-Schools*, you make *moral Virtue* a Cheat, the *Offspring* of *Pride*, and the Enquiry after the *beſt Religion*, but a *Wild-Gooſe Chaſe*. A very worthy Perſon indeed to talk of either *Good* or *Evil!*

Whilſt we can preſerve but the very Name of Religion, a charitable Contribution to educate Children in it, muſt be reckon'd amongſt our beſt Works.

Charity-Schools can never need a Defenſe in a Kingdom, that boaſts of having the Scriptures in the *vulgar Tongue*. For if it be our Glory and Happineſs to have the Bible in *Engliſh*, ſurely it muſt be in ſome Degree glorious to teach our *Natives* how to read it.

You ſay, if any one can ſhew the *leaſt Tittle* of *Blaſphemy* or *Prophaneneſs*, in your Book, or *any Thing tending to Immorality, or a Corruption of Manners, you will burn it yourſelf, at any Time or Place your Adverſary ſhall appoint*. I appoint the firſt Time, and the moſt publick Place, and if you keep your Word, ſhall be your humble Servant.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

HAving in my Second Section mention'd Mr. *Bayle* as the principal Author amongſt thoſe, whoſe Parts have been employed to arraign and expoſe Virtue and Religion, as being only the blind Effects of *Complexion*, natural *Temper* and *Cuſtom*, &c. It may not be improper to recommend to his Admirers, the following Inſtances of that Gentleman's great *Penetration* and *Clearneſs* on this Subject.

Mr. *Bayle* engag'd in a Cauſe where he found it neceſſary to aſſert, that a *Society of Atheiſts*, might be as virtuous Men, as a Society of other People profeſſing Religion; and to maintain this Opinion, he was farther oblig'd to declare, that religious *Opinions* and *Beliefs*, had no Influence *at all* upon Mens Actions.

This Step was very neceſſary to be taken; for if religious *Opinions* or *Beliefs* were allowed to have *any* Influence upon our Actions, then it muſt alſo have been allowed, that a *Society of Atheiſts* muſt have been leſs virtuous, than a Society of People holding religious Opinions.

Mr. *Bayle* therefore roundly deny'd, that religious Opinions have any Influence upon

upon us; and ſet himſelf to prove, that *Complexion*, natural *Temper*, *Cuſtoms*, &c. are the *only* Cauſes of our Actions.

Thus he ſays, he *is perſuaded that Man is that kind of Creature, who with all his boaſted Reaſon*, never *acts by the Principles of his Belief**. Again, *it cannot be deny'd*, that *Man acts* continually, *againſt* Principles. And again, *I pretend to have demonſtrated that Men* never *act by Principle.*

Mr. *Bayle* has often diverted himſelf with the Unreaſonableneſs of thoſe *Divines*, who firſt declare the Sublimity and Inconceivableneſs of the Chriſtian Myſteries, and then pretend to explain them. But they may laugh at him in their Turn, who happens to be as weak and unreaſonable even in his *Philoſophical Chair.*

For he can give it you out as an undeniable Mexim, *that the Mind of Man being ſubject to infinite Caprice and Variety*, no Rule *can be laid down concerning it, not liable to a* thouſand *Objections* **; and then tell you *he has demonſtrated, that Man* never *acts by Principle:* As if he had ſaid, I give you here a *certain* and *infallible Rule* concerning the Mind of Man, not liable to *one* Objection; tho' I aſſure you, *that no Rule can be laid down, not liable to a* thouſand *Objections.*

Mr. *Bayle*

---

* Miſcell. Reflect. p. ** ibid. p. cclxxix.

Mr. *Bayle*, to ſhew that his *Society* of *Atheiſts* might be as virtuous as other Men, affirms, that a *wicked Inclination neither ariſes from our Ignorance of God's Exiſtence*, nor *is check'd by the Knowledge of a ſupreme Judge who puniſhes and rewards. And that an Inclination to Evil, belongs no more to a Heart void of the Senſe of God, than one poſſeſſed with it*, and *that one is under no looſer a Rein than the other* (1).

With how much *Reaſon* and *Freedom* of Mind Mr. *Bayle* aſſerts this, may be ſeen from what he ſays in other Places. Thus in his *hiſtorical Dictionary* he can tell you, *that there is nothing ſo advantageous to Man, if we conſider either the Mind or the Heart, as to* know *God rightly* (2).

He can commend the Saying of *Silius Italicus*, as very *pertinently* ſpoken of the *Carthaginians, alas, miſerable Mortals! your Ignorance of the divine Nature is the original Cauſe of your Crimes.* Again, *I wont deny there have been Pagans, who making the utmoſt Uſe of their Notion of the divine Nature, have render'd it the Means of abating the Violence of their Paſſions* (3).

Theſe Contradictions need no Illuſtration; I ſhall paſs on to ſhew you a few more of the ſame Kind.

Mr. *Bayle*

---

(1) Ibid. p. ccxciv. (2) Vol. 4. p. 2683.
(3) Miſcel. Reflect. p. ccxciv.

Mr. *Bayle* affirm *that Man* never *acts by the Principles of his Belief.* Yet ſee how often he teaches the contrary. Speaking of the ſtrange Opinions and Practices of ſome *Pagans, who, tho' perſuaded of a Providence, deny'd nothing to their Luſts* and *Paſſions:* He gives this as the Reaſon of their Conduct, *either that they* muſt *ſuppoſe the Gods approved theſe Ways, or elſe that one need not trouble ones ſelf whether they did or no* (1.)

See here this elevated Free-Thinker, aſſerting that *Man* never *acts by his Belief*; and yet making it *neceſſary*, that the *Pagans* muſt have had *ſuch* or *ſuch* a *Belief*, or elſe they could never have acted as they did.

Inſtances of this Kind are very numerous. In the Article of the *Sadducees*, he ſays, *the good Life of the Sadducees might have been an Effect* of their believing *a Providence.* Again, the *Orthodox will feel the Activity of that Impreſſion, as well as the Sadducees, and that being moreover* perſuaded *of a future State, Religion will have* a greater Influence *upon their Lives* (2.)

Here a *Belief* of a Providence in this World, is allow'd to be the Cauſe of a *good Life*, and a *Perſuaſion* of a future State affirm'd to have a ſtill *greater Influence* upon our

(1.) Ibid. p. cccciv. (2.) Hiſt. Dict.

our Lives; and yet the same *great Reasoner demonstrates*, that Men always act without any Regard to their *Beliefs* or *Persuasions*.

To demonstrate that *Beliefs* and *Opinions* have no part in the forming our Lives, Mr. *Bayle* appeals to the Lives of Christians; for, *were it otherwise*, says he, *how is it possible that Christians, so clearly instructed from Revelation, supported by so many Miracles, that they must renounce their Sins, in order to be eternally happy, and to prevent eternal Misery, should yet live as they do, in the most enormous Ways of Sin and Disobedience.*

This is Mr. *Bayle*'s invincible Demonstration, that *Beliefs* and *Persuasions* have no Effect upon us, and that Man *never* acts by Principle; tho' you shall see that he can as well demonstrate the contrary to this.

In the Article of *Sommona-codom*, speaking of this Doctrine, *viz. That an old Sinner who has enjoy'd all the Pleasures of Life, will be eternally happy, provided he truly repent on his Death Bed:* He makes this Remark, *doubtless, this may be the Reason why the Fear of God's Judgments, or the Hopes of his Rewards, make no great Impressions upon worldly People*.*

Here you see this learned Philosopher urges the Lives of Christians, as a *Demon-*

* Hist. Dict.

ſtration that Men never act by *Perſuaſion*; and yet tells you, as a Thing *paſt all doubt*, that they live as they do, through a *Perſuaſion* that a Death-Bed Repentance will ſet all at right.

Take another Inſtance of the ſame kind.

Religion and Principle have no Effect upon us: *This muſt be the Caſe*, ſays Mr. Bayle, *or the antient Pagans, who were under the Yoke of numberleſs Superſtitions, continually employ'd in appeaſing the Anger of their Idols, aw'd by infinite Prodigies, and firmly perſuaded the Gods diſpenſed Good or Evil, according to the Life they lead, had been reſtrain'd from all the abominable Crimes they committed* *.

This Paragraph is to ſhew, that religious *Perſuaſions* have no Effect upon us, becauſe, if they had, the *Perſuaſions* of the Pagans muſt have made them good Men.

But Mr. *Bayle* here forgets, that he himſelf has affirm'd that the *Pagan Religion not only taught ridiculous Things, but that it was beſides a Religion* authorizing *the moſt* abominable Crimes †. *That they were led to their Crimes by their very Religion*; *that it muſt have been a Point of* Faith *with them*; *that to make themſelves Imitators of God, they ought to be Cheats, Envious, Fornicators, Adulterers.*

So

---

* Miſcell. Reflect. p. cclxxv. † Ibid. p. cccxc.

So that this Philoſopher ſhews, with great Conſiſtency, that the *Religion* of the *Pagans* engag'd them in *abominable Crimes*; and that the *Pagans* did not act by their Religion, *becauſe* they were guilty of *abominable Crimes*.

But I proceed no farther at preſent, this Specimen of Mr. *Bayle*'s Abſurdities and *Contradictions* on this very Article, where he has been moſt admir'd, may ſuffice to ſhew, that if he has gain'd upon Mens Minds, it has been by other Arts than thoſe of clear Reaſoning. I would not by this inſinuate, that he was not a Man of fine Parts; *Bellarmin*'s Abſurdities, tho' ever ſo many, ſtill leave room to acknowledge his great Abilities. This ſeems to have been Mr. *Bayle*'s Caſe; he was no *Jeſuit* or *Papiſt*, but he was as great a *Zealot* in his way. *Bellarmin* contradicted himſelf for the ſake of *Mother Church*; and Mr. *Bayle* contradicted himſelf, as heartily, for the ſake of an *imaginary* Society a *Society of Atheiſts*.

I have put down theſe few contradictory Paſſages, for the ſake of ſuch as are Profelytes to Mr. *Bayle*'s Philoſophy; let them here ſee, that in following him, they only leave Religion, to follow *Blindneſs* and *Bigottry* in Syſtems of Prophaneneſs.

When *Clergymen* contradict one another, tho' it be but upon a Ceremony of Religion, *Infidels* make great Advantage of it; for,

Irreligion having no Arguments of its own, is forc'd to catch at every Foreign Objection.

But Mr. *Bayle's Self-contradictions* upon the chief Article of his Philoſophy, may, perhaps, not leſſen his Authority with our Men of *Reaſon*.

For whether our *Free-Thinkers* are not ſuch *Bigots*, as to adore Mr. *Bayle's Contradictions*, is what I will not preſume to ſay.

I'll promiſe for nothing, but their little Minds, and blind Zeal, to have a Share in every Error that can give Offence to well-minded Men.

FINIS.

BOOKS printed for William *and* John Innys, *at the* West-end *of St.* Paul's. 1725.

MR. LAW's, three Letters to the Bishop of *Bangor*, the Eighth Edition. 8vo. 1721.

New Memoirs of Literatu re, containing an Account of new Books Printed both at Home and Abroad, with Dissertations upon several Subjects, Miscellaneous Observations, *&c.* for *September*, 1725. (being the Ninth.) *N. B.* These Memoirs will be publish'd, in the first Week in every Month 8vo. Price 1 s. each.

Directions, Counsels and Cautions, tending to prudent Management of Affairs in Common Life. Collected by *Thomas Fuller* M. D. 12°. 1725.

The Principles of Deism truly represented and set in a clear Light, in two Dialogues between a *Sceptick* and a *Deist*. The first concerning the Christian Revelation. The second concerning Natural Religion. The third Edition. 8vo. 1724.

The Christian Institutes: or, *the sincere Word of God.* Being a plain and impartial Account of the whole Faith and Duty of a Christian; collected out of the Writings of the Old and New Testaments: Digested under proper Heads, and deliver'd in the Words of Scripture, by the Right Reverend Father in God, *Francis* Lord Bishop of *Chester*. The fourth Edition, 12°. 1721.

A short Letter of Instruction, shewing the surest Way to Christian Perfection, translated out of *French*. To which are added the Pious Meditations of *Blosius*, upon the Passion of our Blessed Saviour, 12°. 1723.

A Persuasive to a Holy Life, from the Happiness which attends it, both in this World and in the World to come. By *John Ray*, late Fellow of the Royal Society, 8vo. 1719.

An Answer to some late Papers; intituled, *The Independent Whig*; so far as they relate to the Church of *England* as by Law Established: In which her Doctrines, Creeds, Liturgy and Establishment; her Clergy, with their Rights Divine and Human are modestly defended; and their Author's new Notions prov'd to be not only absurd and ridiculous, but also directly opposite to those very Texts of God's Word, on which he pretends to found them. By *Francis Squire*, A. M. Rector of *Exford*, and Vicar of *Cutcomb* and *Luxborow*, *Sommerset*. 8vo. 1723.

An Address to Parents, shewing them the Obligations they are under to take Care of the Christian Education of their Children, and laying before them the principal Points in which they ought to instruct them. By *Joseph Hoole*, Vicar of *Huxey*, 8vo. 1724.

Three

Three Dialogues between *Hylas* and *Philonous*. The Design of which, is plainly to demonstrate the Reality and Perfections of Human Knowledge; the incorporeal Nature of the Soul, and the immediate Providence of a Deity, in opposition to Scepticks and Atheists. Also to open a Method for rendring the Sciences more easy, useful and compendious. By *George Berkley*, M. A. Fellow of *Trinity* College, *Dublin*. The second Edition, 8vo. 1725.

Pious Thoughts concerning the Knowledge and Love of God, and other Holy Exercises. By the late Archbishop of *Cambray*; together with a Letter of Christian Instruction, by a Lady, done out of *French*, 8vo. 1720.

A Discourse of the Truth and Certainty of Natural Religion, and the indispensable Obligations to Religious Worship, from Nature and Reason, in two Books. By *David Martin*, late Pastor of the *French* Church at *Utrecht*. Translated from the *French*. The second Edition, 8vo. 1725.

The Beauty of Holiness in the Common-Prayer, as set forth in four Sermons, preach'd at the Rolls Chapel in the Year 1716. the eight Edition. To which is added, a *Rationale* on Cathedral Worship, or Choir Service, the second Edition, by *Thomas Bisse*, D. D. 8vo. 1721.

Decency and Order in publick Worship, recommended in three Discourses, preach'd in the Cathedral Church of *Hereford*, by *Thomas Bisse*, D. D. Chancellor of the said Church. 8vo. 1723.

Eight Sermons preach'd at the Cathedral Church of St. *Paul's* in Defence of the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ; upon the Encouragement given by the Lady *Moyer*, and at the Appointment of the Lord Bishop of *London*, &c. By *Dan. Waterland*, D. D. Master of *Magdalen* College in *Cambridge*. The second Edition, 8vo. 1720.

Dr. *Mangey*'s Practical Discourses upon the Lord's Prayer, preach'd before the Honourable Society of *Lincoln's-Inn*. The third Edition. 8vo. 1721.

A Practical Discourse concerning the great Duty of Prayer. By *Richard Crossinge*. B. D. Fellow of *Pembroke-Hall* in *Cambridge*, 8vo. 1720.

—— A Practical Discourse concerning the great Duty of Charity, 8vo. 1720.

The devout Soul, or Entertainment for a Penitent, consisting of Meditations, Poems, Hymns and Prayers, in two Parts. By *Tho. Coney*, D. D. Prebendary of *Wells*, and Rector of *Chedzey* in *Somersetshire*, 8vo. 1722.

Primitive Morality: or, the Spiritual Homilies of St. *Macarius* the *Egyptian*, full of very profitable Instructions concerning that Perfection which is expected from Christians, and which it is their Duty to endeavour after. Done out of *Greek* into *English*, with several considerable Emendations, and some Enlargements from a *Bodleian* Manuscript, never before Printed, 8vo. 1721.

Dr. *Lucas*'s Enquiry after Happiness. In three Parts. 1. Of the Possibility of obtaining Happiness. 2. Of the true Notion

tion of human Life. 3. Of Religious Perfection. In 2 Vols. The fifth Edition. 8vo. 1717.

Twenty four Sermons preach'd on several Occasions. In two Vols. By *Richard Lucas*, D. D. The second Edition.

Physico-Theology: Or, a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from his Works of Creation, being the Substance of sixteen Sermons preach'd in St. *Mary-le-Bow* Church, *London*, at the Honourable Mr. *Boyle*'s Lectures, in the Years 1711. and 1712. with large Notes, and many curious Observations. By *W. Derham*, Canon of *Windsor*, Rector of *Upminster* in *Essex*, and F. R. S. The sixth Edition, 8vo. 1723.

Astro-Theology: or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from a Survey of the Heavens, illustrated with Copper Plates. The fifth Edition, 8vo. 1725.

A Defence of the Validity of the English *Ordinations*, and of *the Succession of the Bishops in the Church of* England: Together with Proofs, justifying the Facts advanced in this Treatise. Written in *French*, by the Reverend Father, *Peter Francis Le Courayer*, Canon Regular and Librarian of St. *Genevieve* at *Paris*. To which is prefixed a Letter from the Author to the Translator, 8vo. 1725.

A Discourse of Schism: shewing I. What is meant by Schism. II. That Schism is a damnable Sin. III. That there is a Schism between the Establish'd Church of *England*, and the Dissenters. IV. That this Schism is to be charg'd on the Dissenter's Side. V. That the Modern Pretences of Toleration, Agreements in Fundamentals, *&c.* will not excuse the Dissenters from being guilty of Schism. By *Thomas Bennet*, D. D. Vicar of St. *Giles*'s *Cripplegate*. The fourth Edition, 8vo. 1718.

The Indictment, Arraignment, Tryal and Judgment, at large, of twenty-nine Regicides, the Murtherers of his most Sacred Majesty King *Charles* the First, with their Speeches, 8vo. 1724.

The Christian's Pattern: or, a Treatise of the Imitation of Jesus Christ, By *Thomas a Kempis*. English'd by *George Stanhope* D. D. The tenth Edition, 1721.

Divine Breathings; being the Meditations of St. *Augustine*, his Treatise of the Love of God, Soliloquies and Manual, English'd by *George Stanhope*, D. D. The fifth Edition, 1720.

A Version of the Psalms of *David*, fitted to the Tunes read in Churches. By Sir *John Denham*, Knight of the Bath. 8vo.

The Religious Philosopher: or, the right Use of Contemplating the Works of the Creator. I. In the wonderful Structure of Animal Bodies, and in particular Man. II. In the no less wonderful and wise Formation of the Elements, and their various Effects upon Animal and Vegitable Bodies. And III. In the most amazing Structure of the Heavens, with all its Furniture. Design'd for the Conviction of Atheists and Infidels, by that learned Mathematician, Dr. *Nieuwentyt*. To which is prefix'd a Letter to the Translator by the Reverend *J. T. Desaguliers*, L. L. D. F. R. S. the third Edition, adorn'd will Cuts, 2 Vol. 4to. 1724.

The

The Religion of Nature delineated, the third Edition.

An Analytick Treatise of Conick Sections, and their Use for resolving of Equations in determinate and indeterminate Problems. being the Posthumous Work of the Marquis de l'Hospital, 4to. 1723.

A Commentary upon the Prophecy and Lamentations of *Jeremiah*, by W. *Lowth*, B. D.

A Chronological Essay, on the ninth Chapter of the Book of *Daniel*: or an Interpretation of the Prophecy of the seventy Weeks, whereby the *Jews*, in and for above 460 Years before our Saviour's Time, might certainly know the very Year in which the Messias was to come; by *Peter Lancaster*, Vicar of *Bowden* in *Cheshire*, and sometimes Student of *Christ-Church* in *Oxford*, 4to. 1722.

Mr. *Bragg*'s Practical Discourses upon the Parables of our blessed Saviour, with Prayers annex'd to each Discourse, 2 Vols. 8vo.

Mr. *Ray*'s Three Physico-Theological Discourses, concerning. 1. The Primitive Chaos and Creation of the World. 2. The general Deluge, its Causes and Effects. 3. The Dissolution of the World, and future Conflagration. Wherein are largely discussed, the Production and Use of Mountains; the Original of Fountains, of formed Stones, and Sea Fishes Bones, and Shells found in the Earth; the Effects of particular Floods, and Innundations of the Sea; the Eruptions of Vulcano's; the Nature and Causes of Earthquakes. Also an Historical Account of those two late remakable ones in *Jamaica* and *England*. With Practical Inferences. The fourth Edition. Illustrated with Copper Plates, and much more enlarged than the former Editions, from the Author's own Manuscripts, 8vo. 1721.

The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation. In two Parts. *viz.* the Heavenly Bodies, Elements, Meteors, Fossils, Vegetables, Animals (Beasts, Birds, Fishes and Insects;) more particularly in the Body of the Earth, its Figure, Motion and Consistency; and in the admirable Structure of the Bodies of Man, and other Animals; as also their Generation. *&c.* With Answers to some Objections. By *John Ray*, late Fellow of the Royal Society. The 8th Edition. 8vo. 1722.

The old Religion demonstrated in its Principles, and described in the Life and Practice thereof. The fourth Edition. By *J. Goodman*, D. D. 12°. 1720.

The Fundamental Doctrines of the Church of *England*, explain'd and vindicated from the Calumnies of the *Romanists*, and the Censures of the Presbyterians, and other Dissenters. By *John Shaw*, D. D. and Rector of *East Knoyl* in *Wilts* 3 Vols. 8vo. 1723.